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The Medical Cost Pandemic: Why Limiting Access to
Cost-Effective Treatments Hurts the Global Poor
Govind Persad*

Abstract
Medical innovation in developed countries like the U.S. leads to an ever-changing
medical standardof care. This innovationfrequently also brings rising costs. While these costs
strain even the siZeable health care budgets of developed countries, imposing them on developing
countries would be much more burdensome. Yet a variety of commentators and legal actors, such
as the World Health OrganiZation and UNAIDS, have argued that the same standards of
care must be provided worldwide, and have enforced mandates to that effect. Interpretationsof
the human rght to health as a tight to the "highest attainable standard of health" similarly
advance the idea of a uniform worldwide standardof care and threaten to produce excessive
costs. This Article has two objectives:first, to identif, describe, and criticize the legal mandates
and norms that threaten to produce increased medical costs and reduced access to cost-effective
care in developing countries, and, second, to suggest how we canprevent these outcomes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Pauline Talty petitioned the Australian government to provide her
a potentially lifesaving intestinal transplant.' No doctor in Australia had ever
performed an intestinal transplant; at the University of Pittsburgh-the world
center for intestinal transplants-they cost three million dollars. After initially
refusing Talty's request, the Australian government eventually acquiesced under
political pressure.2 In 2009, Talty left Australia for Pittsburgh, hoping to receive
a transplant.
In 1874, the HMS Dido, too, left Australia, bound not for Pittsburgh but
for Fiji.4 En route to Fiji, two passengers contracted measles, a disease prevalent
in Australia but unknown in Fiji.' In January 1875, the Dido docked in Fiji, where
its passengers disembarked and unknowingly spread measles to the Fijians.' By
June, around 40,000 Fijians were dead.
What else-beyond beginning in Sydney-does Talty's journey have in
common with the Dido's, and why does either matter? This Article argues that
international adoption of the norms that made Talty's journey possible threatens
to produce a second pandemic. While the 1875 measles pandemic resulted from
medical ignorance, what I call the "medical cost pandemic" stems not from
ignorance but from good intentions. And, while the 1875 pandemic involved the
developed world's pathogens inflicting devastation on a developing country, the
medical cost pandemic spreads not through viruses or bacteria, but instead
through norms and mandates. Well-intentioned mandates and norms threaten to
enable expensive standards of care adopted in developed countries like the U.S.
and Australia-standards of care that treat surgery like Talty's three-milliondollar intestinal transplant as an individual entitlement-to cross borders and
devour the much scarcer resources of developing countries. While expensive and
often cost-ineffective standards of care also imperil budgets and healthcare
systems in the developed world, developing countries' more meager resources

I

See Nick Miller, Intestinal Fortitude Required, THE' AGE, Nov. 14, 2009,
http://www.theage.com.au/naional/intesinal-fortitude-required-20091113-ieta.html.

2

See id

3

See Xanthe Kleinig, Pauline Talty Wins $3M Bonwel Cancer Surgey Fight, NEWS.COM.AU (May 15,
2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.news.com.au/national/pauline-wins-3m-surgery-fight/storye6frfkp9-1225712344307 (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).

4

See Carla Garnett, NLM Histoy Lecture Examines Death in the CannibalIslands, NIH RE-CORD, Nov.
16, 1999, availableat http://nibrecord.od.nih.gov/newsletters/111 699/story0l.htm.

5

See id.

6

See id.

7

See id.
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will come under strain far more quickly-just as measles was burdensome in
Australia but catastrophic in Fiji.
To see the catastrophe that mandating universal provision of the medical
care Pauline Talty received would cause, return to Fiji, the victim of the 1875
pandemic. In 2008, its medical budget was approximately 140 million Fijian
dollars (FJD), which was equivalent to 81 million U.S. dollars (USD), and Fiji's
per-capita spending on health care was 165.33 FJD (96.18 USD).' This means
that the three million dollars Australia spent on Talty's transplant would have
consumed more than three percent of Fiji's health care budget-more than
would have been spent on medical care for thirty thousand Fijians. (In contrast,
Australia's per capita spending on health care was twenty times Fiji's.')
Transnationally mandating that all governments providing medical care
provide their citizens the level of care Australia provided Talty would obviously
be unsustainable for a nation like Fiji. Yet the international community
frequently adopts legal norms that threaten to inflict the runaway costs that
beset health systems in developed countries on much poorer nations in the
developing world. For example, as I detail below, interpretations of the right to
health as an individually assertible right to the "highest attainable standard of ...
health""o have allowed private citizens to sue their governments for access to
costly treatments. And norms that direct developing countries to provide the
developed-country standard of care for other medical interventionsrequirements that mandate new pacemakers instead of used ones, or the newest
HIV medications rather than older, cheaper alternatives-leave developing
countries with a choice between providing an unaffordable standard of care and
providing nothing at all.
This Article has two objectives: (1) to identify, describe, and criticize the
legal mandates and norms that threaten to produce a medical cost pandemic, and
(2) to suggest how we can prevent that pandemic. Sections II and III identify
two trends that threaten to produce runaway medical costs: Section II discusses
proposals to mandate developed-country standards of care for specific
conditions, while Section III discusses interpretations of the right to health that

8

See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE Fiji ISLANDS HEALTH SYSTEM REviEw 45-49 (2011),

available

at

http://www.wpro.who.int/asia pacific-observatory/hits/series/

FijiIslandsHealthSystemsReview.pdf. The currency conversion is based on INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, TREASURY REFORMING RATES OF EXCHANGE AS OF DEC. 31, 2008,

http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Treasury-Reporting-Ratesof-Exchange-as-of-December-31-2008 (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).

9

See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supranote

1o

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 12,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter

8, at

fig. 3-5.
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have similar effects. Section IV evaluates and criticizes arguments that have been
advanced in defense of these norms and mandates, such as their refusal to harm
patients with dangerous drugs, their expressive endorsement of a just global
distribution of resources, and their usefulness as a lever to improve global
standards of health. Section V discusses how we can reshape our medical norms
to prevent the pandemic and rein in medical costs. Making these changes before
unaffordable spending commitments become entrenched could give developing
countries a chance to protect themselves from the problems that developed
countries now face.
This project brings together two important but hitherto disconnected
debates in law and global health. The debate over whether the developed world's
standards of medical care should be adopted worldwide has focused on cases
involving research on human subjects but has ignored questions of clinical
care." And while recent debates over universal health coverage in the U.S. have
drawn attention to problems of priority-setting in health and to Americans'
inability to limit health care costs,12 these debates have focused solely on the
American context. This Article will demonstrate how well-intentioned legal
mandates threaten to globalize the problems that afflict health care systems in
the U.S. and other developed countries.
II. LIMITING ACCESS TO COST-EFFECTIVE TREATMENTS
A. Pharmaceuticals
The pace of technical advances in treatment for HIV has been remarkable.
The first effective treatment for HIV-infected patients, azidothymidine (AZT),
received FDA approval in 1987.13 Over the next two decades, rapidly improving
treatments have largely rendered HIV a chronic and manageable-though not
yet curable--condition in the developed world.14
These advances have prompted efforts to ensure better outcomes for HIVinfected patients in developing countries. Some have called for revisions to the
11

See, for example, David P. Fidler, "GeographicalMorality" Revisited: International Relations, International
Law, and the Controversy over Placebo-Controlkd HIV Clinical Trials in Developing Countries, 42 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 299 (2001); Annette Rid & Harald Schmidt, The 2008 Declarationof Helsinki-FirstAmong
Equalsin Research Ethics?, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 143 (2010).

12

See generally Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral
Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. Ri-v. 523 (2014); Christopher
Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the Health Care Game, 98 CoRNu,

L.Ri.v. 921 (2013).
13
14

See Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 196 (8th Cit. 1989).
See Sarah J. Newman, Note, Prevention, Not Prejudice: The Role of Federal Guidelines in HIVCriminali.ationRefon, 107 Nw. U. L. Riv. 1403, 1410-11 (2013).
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pharmaceutical patent regime to ensure better access to high-quality
treatments.15 Others have called for adopting laws and regulations ensuring that
patients in developing countries receive the same medications that developed
countries provide. The Executive Director of the Joint United Nations Program
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), for example, recently noted that UNAIDS has
adopted a new Outcome Framework, which advocates "ending the two-tiered
system of global AIDS treatment" and "stopping the practice of using
outmoded drugs for people in developing countries."" Kevin De Cock, director
of the HIV/AIDS Department of the WHO, similarly argued in 2009 that "[t]he
world cannot allow a permanently two-tiered system of global AIDS treatment
with late initiation of outmoded drugs reserved for the South.""
The WHO, like UNAIDS, has adopted regulations that reflect the
commitment to avoiding two-tiered care. While the WHO, like many other
international organizations, generally lacks power to enforce its regulations on
external actors,' its definitions and directives have been carried into force by
national legal systems. 9 They also shape private actors' decisions when drafting
contracts and internal regulations.20 In 2010, the WHO's guidelines on HIV

15
16

17

18

19

20

See, for example, Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities. An Open Licensing
Approachfor Universit Innovations, 20 Bi-maiuKiY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1036 (2005).
Michel Sidibe, Exec. Dir., UNAIDS, Crisis, Opportunity and Transformation: AIDS Response at
a Crossroads, Address to Program Coordinating Board, at 5 (June 23, 2009),
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/speech/2009/jcl750
openingpcb-speech en.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
Kevin M. De Cock, Dir., HIV/AIDS Dept., WHO, Presentation at the 2009 HIV/AIDS
http://www.who.int/hiv/events/
10,
2009),
(June
Meeting
Implementers'
9
implementers200 _kdc/en/index.htmi (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
See Eric A. Posner & David Weisbach, InternationalParetianism:A Defense, 13 CHi. J. INT'L. L. 347,
354 (2013) (listing the WHO among several international organizations that "do not possess
formal legal authority and so cannot issue binding rules or orders"). But see David P. Fidler, The
Future of the World Health Organi.Zaion: What Role for InternationalLaw?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'. L.
1079, 1087-88 (1998) (noting that the WHO has the power to issue regulations that "come into
force for each WHO Member State unless a Member State notifies WHO of reservations to, or
rejection of, the adopted regulations within a fixed period of time," although it has rarely used this
power).
See, for example, Guo Qi Wang v. Holder, 583 F.3d 86, 91 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (using WHO guiding
principles on organ transplantation to support a finding that black market organ sales are a serious
nonpolitical crime); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the U.S.
Department of State employs the WHO definition of female genital mutilation); United States v.
S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 921 (4th Cir. 1992) (referencing legislative history that relies on
WHO classification of addiction as a mental disorder).
See, for example, Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 168 n.2 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting
that Westinghouse's contract incorporated WHO regulations); Drolla v. ChevronTexaco Corp.,
No. A104161, 2004 WL 2750328, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (noting that Chevron adopted
WHO definitions as part of its internal job qualifications).
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treatment recommended that health care systems worldwide-including those in
resource-limited settings-"take steps to progressively reduce the use of
stavudine (d4T) in first-line regimens because of its well-recognized toxicities.'; 21
As Jay Purcell observes,
Stavudine exemplifies the clearest disconnect between developed- and
developing-world standards of care for HIV patients. An NRTI [nucleoside
reverse transcriptase inhibitor], [s]tavudine reaches over 75 percent of
patients in developing countries. It does not, however, appear on the list of
therapies recommended by the WHO or Department of Health and Human

Services. Domestically, physicians replaced [s]tavudine years ago, when
superior, safer, and more effective NRTIs entered the market. 22
But transitioning from stavudine to the WHO's (and Purcell's) preferred
substitute, tenofovir, would increase costs dramatically. Purcell notes that

"[e]xplaining the omnipresence of [s]tavudine in resource-limited settings is
simple: the Clinton Foundation's 2009 Antiretroviral [ARV] Price List records
[s]tavudine, at $0.036/unit, as the cheapest ARV on earth. Tenofovir,
[s]tavudine's domestic replacement, sells at $0.280/unit." 23 This represents nearly
an eightfold difference in price.
HIV is not the only condition where drug recommendations in developed
and developing countries have diverged due to cost considerations, and where
some have called for mandating the developed-country standard of care as a
universal standard. The same has been true for epilepsy treatments. A recent
article in the Bulletin of the ITWorld Health Organization notes that researchers
historically "advocated the use in developing countries of antiepileptic drugs
such as phenobarbital . .. which were considered to be particularly desirable
because of their low cost and the quality of the treatment they provided."24 The
authors note that a variety of newer antiepileptic medications, which are less
toxic and have fewer side effects, have superseded phenobarbital in developed
countries .25
This divergence between antiepileptic medications provided in developed

and developing countries has been criticized as morally objectionable:

21

22

23

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY FOR HIV INFECTION IN ADULTS
AND ADOLESCENTS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH 20 (2010), available at

http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241 599764 eng.pdf.
Jay Purcell, Adverse Clinical and Public Health Consequences of Limited Anti-Retrviral Licensing, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 103, 119 (2010).

24

Id.
K. Nimaga et al., Treatment With Phenobarbitaland Monitoring of Epileptic Patients in Rural Mali, 80
Buu.. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 532, 535 (2002).

25

See id.
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[P]henobarbital's profile of toxicity has discouraged its use in developed
countries, at least as a first choice anticonvulsant. The most important toxic
effects are hyperactivity in children and sedation in adults, and it is cynical
to believe that these side effects are of no importance in the less privileged
developing countries. This is to put a geographic hierarchy on brain
function, which is unacceptable. 26
Similarly, a letter to the Lancet argues for focusing on absolute effectiveness to
the exclusion of cost considerations:
If a broad-spectrum antiepileptic is proven better as first-line treatment than
phenobarbital, on the basis of clinical trials in developing countries, then it
should be bought in large quantities at discount and distributed to epilepsytreatment programmes in developing countries .... The epilepsy and
public-health communities can do better than phenobarbital or phenytoin
for the world's 34 million people with epilepsy who live in the developing
world. 27
And, in a 2004 article in the British MedicalJournal,physicians Rajendra Kale and
Emilio Perucca similarly ask: "If people with epilepsy in Britain are not
prescribed phenobarbital because of its toxicity, is it ethical to recommend its
use in developing countries?" 28
However, others have argued that phenobarbital's exceptionally low cost
ethically justifies its continuing use in developing countries. Patrick Kwan and
Martin Brodie argue that "[p]erhaps the greatest advantage of PB [phenobarbital]
is its unparalleled low net cost," and contrast it with later anti-epilepsy drugs that
cost four or five times as much and cutting-edge drugs that cost more than a
hundred times as much. 29 Kwan and Brodie go on to note that "[fjor developing
countries with low purchasing power, cost-effectiveness is of top priority in
[I]n poor regions, 'the choice is not between
choosing treatment ....
phenobarbital and a new medicament but between phenobarbital and no
treatment at all."'o Interestingly, the WHO's position here has been to endorse

26

S.D. Shorvon & P.J. Farmer, Epilepy in Developing Countries:A Review of Epidemiological,Sociocultural,
and TreatmentAspects, 29 EPiImesIA S36, S49 (1988).

27

Edwin Trevathan, Marco T. Medina & Amanda Madrid, Antiepileptic Drugs in Developing Countries,
351 LANCET 1210, 1210 (1998).
Rajendra Kale & Emilio Perucca, Revisiting Phenobarbitalfor Epiley: Large Gaps in Knowledge Still
Exist, but We May Be UnderestimatingIts Clinical Value, 329 BRiT. MED.J. 1199, 1199 (2004).

28

29

30

J. Brodie, Phenobarbitalfor the Treatment of Epilepy in the 21st Century: A
Gitical Review, 45 EPil.EPSIA 1141, 1145 (2004).
Id. at 1146-47 (quoting Nimaga, supra note 24, at 535). See also Kale & Perucca, supra note 28, at
1200 ("In the developing world, when the choice is between the cheapest treatment or no
treatment at all, phenobarbital should be used, particularly in adults.").
Patrick Kwan & Martin
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the use of phenobarbital in developing countries, in contrast to its rejection of a
"two-tiered" regime of HIV medications.31
Bacterial meningitis represents another illness for which the WHO has
permitted a disparity between developed- and developing-country treatments.
Both the antibiotic ceftriaxone and a combination therapy of penicillin and
chloramphenicol are effective in treating bacterial meningitis. Ceftriaxone is
more effective and has fewer side effects,32 but until becoming generic was
substantially more expensive than the penicillin/chloramphenicol combination.
In 1997, the WHO recommended that ceftriaxone be used in developed
countries
but
that
developing
countries
use
the
lower-cost
penicillin/chloramphenicol combination.3 3 Once ceftriaxone became available as
a lower-cost generic, the WHO recommended ceftriaxone worldwide.34 The
WHO's decision to recommend the lower-cost penicillin/chloramphenicol
combination in developing countries seemed to accept that high costs and
scarcity of resources could justify using cheaper but less effective treatments.
International bodies like the WHO and UNAIDS are not the only ones to
adopt the view that developing-country patients must receive developed-country
standards of care if they are to receive care at all. Domestic law in the U.S. did
the same for many years by prohibiting American firms from exporting
domestically unapproved drugs, even if approved in the importing country.
Between 1938 and 1986, American companies were not permitted to export
medicines to other countries unless the FDA had approved those medicines for

31

32

See Kwan & Brodie, supra note 29, at 1141 (noting that phenobarbital "is recommended by the
World Health Organization as first-line for partial and generalized tonic-clonic seizures in
developing countries," even though "its purported propensity to cause sedation and other
cognitive and behavioral side effects has relegated it to second- or third-line use in many parts of
the industrialized world"); see also World Health Organization [hereinafter WHO], Global
Campaign Against Epilepsy, Epilepgy in the WHO African Region: Bridging the Gap, AFR/MNH/04.1
(2004) ("One may remember that 61 to 72.8% of the population in the poorest countries of the
African region live on less than U.S. $1.00 per day. This is a convincing fact, underlining the need
to use [plhenobarbital as the first choice in public health intervention for epilepsy.").
See Edilane L. Gouveia et al., Clinical Outcome of Pneumococcal Meningitis During the Emergence of
Pentillin-Resistant Streptococcus Pneumoniae: An Observational Study, 11 BMC INFE'CTIous
Dis EASES, no. 323, 1-2 (2011).

33

See WHO, Antimicrobial and Support Therapy for Bacterial Meningitis in Children: Report of the Meeting of
18-20 June 1997 Geneva, Suniterland, WHO/EMC/BAC/98.2 (1997), at 3, available at
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/meningitis/whoemcbac982.pdf.

34

See WHO, StandardiZed Treatment of Bacterial Meningitis in Africa in Epidemic and Non-Epidemic
Situations, WHO/CDS/EPR/2007.3 (2007), at 5, available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/
publications/meningitis/WHOCDS EPR_2007_3.pdf.
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use in the U.S." (In contrast, several countries in Europe permitted the export
of drugs unapproved for domestic use.36)
In 1986, Congress considered and ultimately approved the Drug Exports
Amendments Act (DEAA), which relaxed restrictions on the export of
unapproved drugs. The DEAA's proposal and passage prompted extensive
debate, much of which focused on an ethical issue that also arose in the cases
above: may different countries adopt different standards of care? As Mindy
Hatton notes, "[o]ne of the most repeated criticisms of the drug export
legislation was that it represented an invidious double standard by protecting
American consumers from potentially unsafe drugs while leaving the rest of the
world to fend for itself."" Two of the most prominent proponents of the
double-standard argument were Sidney Wolfe, of the consumer advocacy group
Public Citizen, 38 and Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum." In his minority
statement, Metzenbaum argued:

35

See FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF INT'L PROGRAMS, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPORTS
UNDER THE FDA ExPORT REFORM AND ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1996 11 (2007), available at

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucml25898.pdf; see also Eve
C. Gartner, Note, Regulating the Export of Unapproved Drugs: An Examination of the Drug Export
AmendmentsAct of 1986,19 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 98-102 (1987).
36

See U.S. INT'l. TRADE COMM'N, Gi.OBAL COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. ADVANCED-TECHNOLOGY

INDUSTRIES: PHARMACEUTICALS, 1991 WL 790123, at *59 (1991) ("France, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Switzerland reportedly do not ban the export of unapproved drugs.").
37

Mindy Hatton, Note, Exporting Unapproved New Drugs: Saving American Jobs or Imperiling Foreign
Consumers? 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 429, 440 (1988). See Alan H. Kaplan, F#ty Years of
Drug Amendments Revisited: In Easy-To-Swallow Capsule Form, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 179, 193 (1995)
(discussing "those who believed that it would be immoral for the United States to permit the
export of drugs that could not be marketed domestically"); Gartner, supra note 35, at 104-05;
Jeanmarie T. Sales, Note, The Drug Export Amendment Act of 1986, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 475, 481 (1989) ("Opponents of drug export reform claimed that permitting the export
of unapproved drugs to foreign markets created a double standard: a standard of proven safety
and efficacy for drugs for United States consumers, and a lesser standard for exported drugs.");
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term RestorationAct of 1984, Hearing on S. 2748 before the S. Comm. on
Labor & Hum. Resources, 98th Cong. 229 jhereinafter Hearing] (statement of Louise Greenfield,
Staff Attorney, Public Citizen's Congress Watch) ("Our most fundamental argument against the
export of unapproved drugs is that it would establish a double standard. This violates our basic
belief that the health and safety of international consumers is no less important than that of
American consumers."); id at 330 (statement of Sybil Shainwald, National Women's Health
Network) ("What's not good enough for Americans cannot be good enough for the Third
World.").

38

See Hatton, supra note 37, at 440-41 ("In testimony before the Senate, Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D.,
Director of Public Citizen's Health Research Group, described this double standard as the most
fundamental argument against the bill, and one that he believed was a compelling reason for
retaining the ban, outweighing the industry's claims that lifting the export ban would lead to the
creation of jobs and halt the loss of technology and capital.").

39

See Gartner,supra note 35, at 104-05.
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This legislation sets up [a] double standard-American consumers would be
protected from unsafe, hazardous and ineffective drugs through the PDA
approval process, while foreign consumers and Americans travelling abroad
would receive inferior protection. The message S. 1848 would send to the
rest of the world is clear and unambiguous: "These drugs aren't good
enough for us, but they're good enough for you." How will this nation be
judged if one of these unapproved drugs causes death and injury abroad
while American citizens are protected because we only allowed the drug to
be produced for export? Why should we tarnish the "Made in America"
label? 40
This view had earlier antecedents-the 1982 Report to the President on the
Review of U.S. Hazardous Substances Export Policy stated that "materials
banned at home should not, on ethical grounds, be sold to other countries."41
In contrast, others argued that imposing the U.S. standard of care on other
nations was inappropriately paternalistic, inconsistent with principles of
international sovereignty, and might deny patients in developing countries
beneficial treatments.42 We see evidence of this in the fact that religious
organizations attempted to use the pre-DEAA prohibition on export to block
developing countries' access to affordable contraceptives that were not approved
in the U.S. 43 The final version of the DEAA permitted the export of drugs not
approved by the FDA for use in the U.S., but only to a list of developed
countries.
A particularly interesting departure from the uniform-standards view was
the "tropical disease" exception, which permitted unapproved drugs to be
exported to developing countries for the treatment of tropical diseases. In
reviewing applications under this exception, the DEAA directed the FDA to
consider not whether the drug was efficacious by U.S. standards, but rather
whether it would be safe and effective by developing-world standards. (In contrast,
40

41

42

43

S. REP. No. 99-225, at 67 (1985) (minority views of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum), available at
http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=428126.
American Home Products Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45839, at *25 (Mar. 8,
1984).
See Gartner, supra note 35, at 105 ("The contrary argument, based on principles of sovereignty,
emphasizes that each country should have the right to make its own regulatory decisions as to
which drugs to import, independent of the decisions of other nations.").
See The Upjohn Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45801, at *3-17 (Mar. 7, 1984); see
also BETsY HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS 182 (1995). Exporting
manufacturers had to meet additional conditions: most importantly, an Investigational New Drug
(IND) application had to have been made for the drug's active ingredient. See id. As Sales notes,
the IND requirement allowed the FDA to block exports-even when approved and requested by
a developing country-by making a final determination to disapprove a new drug for U.S. use or
by placing the IND application on clinical hold. See Sales, supra note 37, at 492. However, the
FDA Export Reform and Enhancement Act of 1996 removed the requirement of filing an IND
application.
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opponents of the DEAA had argued for a single safety and efficacy standard
worldwide.") A commentator at the time observed that the "FDA's
administration of the tropical disease drug export provisions will be particularly
interesting to watch. For the first time since there was an efficacy requirement
for new drugs, FDA must now apply a second, lesser standard for efficacy for
one class of drugs."45 However, a 1994 study found that this exception went
unused between 1987 and 1992.46

The FDA Export Reform and Enhancement Act of 1996 liberalized
regulations on drug export to developing nations. It permitted exports to any
country as long as the product exported was approved for use in a listed
developed country. Rather than positioning the FDA as the sole gatekeeper, the
1996 Act in effect allowed the judgment of other developed nations' regulatory
bodies to substitute for the FDA's. Although it also expanded the tropical
disease provision to include devices, diagnostic interventions, and treatments for
non-tropical diseases that are "not of significant prevalence" in the U.S.,47 it did
not explicitly permit the decisions of other developed countries' regulatory
bodies to substitute for the FDA's judgment as to whether a drug qualified for
that provision.48
The 1996 Act also allowed the export of drugs not approved in any
developed country if: (a) the drugs complied with the laws of the foreign country
and that country had adequate ability to review their safety; or (b) the foreign
country had requested the drugs' export, and the FDA judged that the drugs
were safe and effective under foreign conditions of use. However, unapproved
drugs exported under this provision still needed to meet Good Manufacturing
44

See, for exampk, Hearing, supra note 37, at 236 (statement of Louise Greenfield and Janet S.
Hathaway, Staff Attorneys, Public Citizen's Congress Watch) ("The only justifiable exception to a
basic rule against exporting unapproved drugs would be to allow the American manufacture and
export of drugs for diseases which occur only abroad .... Because U.S. approval probably would
not be sought due to the lack of a U.S. market, this would not constitute a double standard ....
[We would seriously question whether any drug which the FDA has affirmatively banned should
be approved for export."); id. at 344 (statement of Philip R. Lee, M.D., Professor, University of
California, San Francisco) ("I would agree that no drug should be exported that has been banned
in the United States. There should be no exception to this, including the proposal that export
would be prohibited 'unless FDA or USDA determines that it is nonetheless eligible for export
because of particular diseases or health conditions abroad that do not exist in the United States.'
It is inconceivable to me that the U.S. Congress would permit the export of a drug whose use had
been banned in the United States.") (citation omitted).

45
46

Sales, supra note 37, at 498.
See Sheila R. Shulman et al., The Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986: Is ItAIt
49 FooD & DRUG L.J. 367, 379 (1994).

47

FoOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 35, at 50-51.

48

See Dan Phair, Note, Orphan Drug Programs, Public-Private Partnerships and Current Efforts to Develop
Treatmentsfor Diseases of Poverty, 4J. HEALTH & BioMEDICAl L. 193, 224 (2008).
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Practices standards.49 These standards have been enforced in court against at
least one medical device manufacturer.
The changes from the pre-1986 to the post-1996 regime of drug export
were dramatic, and seemed to reflect a shift away from Metzenbaum and
Wolfe's view-that different standards for the U.S. and developing countries
were unacceptable-toward the view that "foreign nations have a right to make
autonomous decisions regarding the potential risks and benefits of new
pharmaceuticals,"" and that "other countries have different needs and regulatory
structures."S2 For example, as Eve Gartner notes with regard to the

contraceptive Depo-Provera,
the risk-benefit determination in a less developed country may emphasize
the dearth of inexpensive, effective, and unobtrusive methods of birth
control; the high mortality rate for women in childbearing, which may
warrant using riskier contraception in order to prevent childbearing; the
greater need to control population growth which may also justify the use of
riskier contraception; and the shorter life expectancy for women in less
developed countries, which statistically decreases the possibility that a
woman taking Depo-Provera will die from breast cancer.53
The post-1996 regime hews much more closely to the view that "limitations on
unapproved new drugs were contrary to the international law principle that
sovereign nations are entitled to make their own determinations as to what they
will or will not accept within their borders."54
However, the post-1996 regime still contains substantial deviations from a

principle of deference to other nations' regulatory schemes: under the 1996 Act,

49
50

See Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and HarnwoniZation, 29 SETON HAL. L. REV. 692,
704-05 (1998).
See generally United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Boxes of Articles of Device, No. 071769, 2007 WL 1575188 (D.N.J. May 30, 2007); Edward M. Basile et al., Export of Pharmaceuticals
and Medical Devices under the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act: FDA's Striking Change in Interpretation
Post-Shelhigh, 64 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 149 (2009).

51

52

Michael Traynor & Brian C. Cunningham, Emerging Product lability Issues in Biotechnology, 3 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 149, 190 n.142 (1988). See Hearing, supra note 37, at 8 (statement of Mark Novitch,
M.D., Acting Comm'r of Food and Drugs, Food and Drug Administration) ("We believe that the
governments of other nations are the proper authorities to address their own health needs, the
diseases and health-related characteristics of their populations, the nature of their health care
delivery systems, the availability of treatment alternatives, and all of the many other factors that go
into these risk/benefit decisions.").
Marc J. Scheineson, Legal Overview ofLikey FDA Regulation ofInternet Promotion, 51 FoOD & DRUG
L.J. 697, 715 (1996).

s3

Gartner, supra note 35, at 107. See generaly Susan D. Goland, Note, Export of PharmaceuticalProducts
Under the Federal Food, Drg, and Cosmetic Act, 13 CORNEL.L INT'L. L.J. 125 (1980) (making similar
arguments).

54

Kaplan, supra note 37, at 193.
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the FDA may still ban exports if it perceives an imminent danger to public
health in the importing country, regardless of whether the importing country
perceives such a danger." David Fidler notes that such bans "show federal law
moving beyond deference to local laws toward independent health-based review
of U.S. exports."" Advocates for exporters have objected to this non-deferential
aspect of the Good Manufacturing Practices requirement, stating that "it should
be evident that the intent of Congress in the Act was to avoid the needless
destruction of potentially valuable drug products that meet the needs and
standards of other countries, if not those of our own," and criticizing legal
standards under which "bulk drugs manufactured for export, under conditions
which do not meet current good manufacturing practice requirements, would be
adulterated and subject to seizure and destruction the instant they are
manufactured, without regard to whether they could readily and legally be sold
abroad.""
B. Medical Donations
The WHO's guidelines on medical donation represent another medical
norm that imposes First World standards on the Third World. These guidelines,
adopted in 2000, regulate donations of medical equipment between countries.
They specify that "there should be no double standard in quality. If the quality
of an item is unacceptable in the donor country, it is also unacceptable as a
donation.""

These

standards

have

been

incorporated

by

some

non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) that work in the area of medical equipment
reuse: the Medical Surplus Recovery Organization's Code of Conduct, for
instance, incorporates the "no double standard" language from the WHO's
guidelines.59 Legal commentators have also endorsed the guidelines."o

ss
56

See Ansis M. Helmanis, The FDA Export Reform and Enhancement Act of 1996: The FDA's New
ExtratermitorialAuthorityoverlabeling and PromotionalPractices, 51 FooD & DRUG L.J. 631,632 (1996).
David P. Fidler, A GlobaliZed Theory of Public Health Law, 30J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150, 154 (2002).

57

Brief of Appellant, United States v. Kanasco, 123 F.3d 209 (4th Cit. 1997) (No. 96-1996), 1996
WL 33453853, at *8-9.

58

WHO, Guidelines for Health Care Equipment Donations, at 9, WHO/ARA/97.3 (March 2000),
available at http://www.who.int/medical-devices/publications/en/DonationGuidelines.pdf.

59

CATHOLIC HEALTH Ass'N OF THE U.S., MEDICAL SURPLUS CODE OF CONDUCT 9 (2012), available

at http://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/international-outreach/medical-surplus-code-ofconduct.pdf. See generally THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND COLLEGE OF
RADIOLOGISTS, POSITION STATEMENT ON INT'L DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN RADIOLOGY AND
RADIATION ONCOLOGY 5 (2013), available at http://www.ranzcr.edu.au/component/docman/

doc download/2866-international-development-activities-position-statement; K.D. Bustamante
et al., Medical Equipment Conditions for Underserved Rural Hospitals in Chihuahua, Mexico, paper
presented at the 7th International Conference on Appropriate Healthcare Technologies for
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The WHO's requirement that donated items meet First World standards
has the desirable effect of preventing the donation of ineffective or dangerous
medical equipment. But it sweeps much more broadly than that, also restricting
access to items that could benefit patients but do not meet the high standards
imposed by First World regulators. In so doing, the WHO's directive limits
access to equipment that could save individuals, particularly individuals in the
developing world, from disease and death.
Among the most prominent limiting effects of the WHO's guidelines is
their inconsistency concerning reuse of implantable devices. Heart arrhythmias
cause substantial mortality and morbidity in both developed and developing
countries." Pacemakers could improve length and quality of life for many of
these patients.62 However, new pacemakers are very expensive, often costing
more than one year of income for the average citizen of a developing country."
This high cost means that, in many developing countries, new implantable
pacemakers are available only to a small fraction of the richest citizens, and are
almost never available to average-income patients.64 In an effort to help
arrhythmia patients in developing countries, NGOs have implemented programs
to reuse pacemakers from cadavers in developed countries." These are then
shipped to developing countries for implantation in patients. Reused pacemakers
perform nearly as well as new ones,66 and these efforts to reclaim medical
devices in developed countries and reuse them in developing countries have
garnered broad support.67 However, the U.S. and European Union prohibit the
domestic reuse of pacemakers.6 ' Following the WHO guidelines, therefore,
blocks developing country patients from receiving beneficial medical
interventions by limiting the donated devices they receive.
The WHO guidelines would also block the cost-effective reuse of singleuse items (SUIs) where such items are not reused in developed countries. Such

61

Developing Countries, Sept. 18-19, 2012, available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/
stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6458813.
See, for example, Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributionsof Property:A Broken System Reimagined, 50
HARV.J. ON LEGis. 263, 316 (2013) (praising the WHO regulations as "sensible").
See Jamie VanArtsdalen et al., Pacemaker Reuse for Patients in Resource Poor Countries: Is Something

62

A/nays Better than Nothing?, 55 PROGRESS CARDIOVASCUIAR Dis. 300, 300-01 (2012).
See id. at 301.

60

63
64

See Krishna Aragam et al., The Ethics of Pacemaker Reuse: Might the Best Be the Enemy ofthe Good?, 97
HEART 2005, 2005 (2011).
See VanArtsdalen et al., supra note 61, at 301.

65

See id.

66

See Aragam et al., supra note 63, at 2005.

67

See id.

68

See VanArtsdalen et al., supra note 61, at 302.
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reuse could prevent developed countries from being held "financial hostage to
manufacturers" and free resources for allocation "to other sectors of healthcare
that are currently lacking."" Examples include the reuse of anesthesia
equipment7 0 as well as neurosurgery equipment."1
As well as inhibiting reuse of medical devices, the WHO's prohibition
serves to block developing-country citizens from receiving supplies of expired
but otherwise unobjectionable medications that could be beneficial. Many
developed countries set conservative expiration dates for their medications. Yet
there is compelling evidence that most medications are effective long after their
printed expiration dates. Ophthalmologist John Sandford-Smith describes
several of his experiences with effective outdated medications:
When we had more surgery to do than we had anticipated I have used
lignocaine at least 10 years out of date, stored away in a hospital pharmacy
in the middle of the country, without any apparent loss of its effect. I have
found that even biologically active drugs such as freeze dried hyaluronidase
seem to retain their potency even years after an expiry date. When unable to
sleep because of jet lag, I have benefited from very outdated temazepam. 72
The most exhaustive study comes from the U.S. Department of Defense's Shelf
Life Extension Program (SLEP), initiated to evaluate whether drug stockpiles
would need to be discarded, and which studied the biological activity of
numerous drugs after their expiration date. SLEP found that most drugs would
be effective and safe for several years after their expiration date, with only
marginal declines in effectiveness." Other studies support their research.74
As with pacemakers, developed countries have so far largely been able to
absorb the high costs of conservative expiration dates. (However, recent lawsuits
alleged that drug companies profited unjustly from excessively conservative

71

A. Moszczynski, Is Once Alvays Enough? Revisiting the Single Use Item, 35 J. MED. ETHics 87, 88
(2009).
See A.R. Gatrad et al., Equipment Donation to Developing Countries, 62 ANAESTHESIA 90, 91 (2007)
("The donation of date-expired equipment also represents an ethical dilemma, particularly the
accusation of double standards-if a piece of equipment is deemed unacceptable in the donor
country, then it should be viewed in the same way in the recipient country. However, in the face
of impoverished anaesthesia systems, should armoured tubes that are out of date be disposed of,
or could good use be made of them in an environment where tracheal tubes are routinely re-used
many times?").
See Joong-Uhn Choi, The Promotion of Pediatric NeurosurgeU Throughout the World, 23 CHILD.

72

NERVOUS SYST. 929, 929 (2007) ("[Wie must consider donating medical equipment and
instruments to developing countries, which Isic] are no longer used in developed countries.").
John Sandford-Smith, Letter, OutdatedDrugs May Be Useful, 326 BRIT. MED.J. 51, 51 (2003).

73

See generaly Jay M. Pomerantz, Recyclng Expensive Medication: Why Not?, 6

69

7o

MFnSCAPE GuN. MED. 4

(2004).
74

See id. (collecting studies).
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expiration dates," and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
suggested relaxing expiration dates to remedy drug shortages.") In contrast,
imposing these expiration dates on developing countries less able to bear high
costs means that many individuals could go without beneficial medicines. As
Sandford-Smith points out in a letter to the British MedicalJournal, the alternative
to an outdated medication donation no longer acceptable in the donor country is
not a brand-new medication. Rather, the alternative "to outdated medicine is no
medicine at all," while outdated medications can frequently be effective.77 Where
outdated medication provides a greater benefit than the likely alternatives,
prohibiting it can produce a substantial medical burden.
The main justifications offered for mandating the same standard of care in
developed and developing countries appeal to the disrespect that different
standards of care might show. Sandford-Smith observes:
This issue of drugs-or even of sterile wrapped equipment, such as
intraocular lenses-that are past their expiry date is unfortunately an
extremely sensitive one with customs officials and the like in developing
countries. I understand the point of view of someone without any scientific
training who sees a label stating that something has expired on a certain date
and feels it is his or her responsibility to destroy or confiscate it to protect
the country from the condescending benevolence of the rich Western
world. 8
Alice Moszczynski suggests a similar concern about what the donation of singleuse items expresses:
It is common practice to donate unused SUIs [single-use items] to medical
missions for use in majority world countries. We must pause here and ask
two material questions. First, if these items can indeed be reprocessed for
reuse, why are we not using these items in our country and demonstrating
fiscal soundness? Second, if these items are not acceptable for use in our
workplace, how are they acceptable for use in a needy country? While the
responsibility and risk rests with the medical mission to decide what is used
or discarded, we must be very careful and consider what message is sent to
the global community at large when donating SUIs. 7 1
Even if such donations produce a medical benefit, the argument goes, they may
express a disrespectful message. In contrast, prohibiting the reuse of medical

7s

See, for example, Raskas v. Johnson &Johnson, 719 F.3d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 2013) (describing three
lawsuits of this kind).

76

See Ass'N
EFFECTS

OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, COPING WITH AND MITIGATING THE
oF SHORTAGES OF EMERGENCY MEDICATIONs
18-20 (2012), available at

http://www.ems.gov/pdf/2013/ASTHOShortages-ofEmergencyMeds.pdf.

77

Sandford-Smith, supra note 72, at 51.

78

Id.

79

Moszczynski, supranote 69, at 89.
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items might appear to demonstrate appropriate respect for the inestimable value
of health: as Moszczynski observes, "it is argued that single use only practices
are fiscally sound, for each patient is treated the same in receiving a new item,
and what cost can be put on a person's health?"so
However, where scarcity exists, both of Moszczynski's last two claims are
misleading. While every patient who receives something is "treated the same in
receiving a new item,"81 those patients who receive nothing-but perhaps could
have received a beneficial reused item were one available-are treated very
differently, and end up worse off than they could have been. And where scarcity
exists, as I argue in Section IV, refusing to compare costs against health benefits
can undermine public health and divert resources from other worthwhile goals.
C. Vaccines
Currently, different vaccines are used for the same conditions in the
developed and developing world. For example, although whole-cell vaccine is
effective at preventing the dangerous communicable disease pertussis (also
known as "whooping cough"), it occasionally causes serious side effects.82 These
side effects led to lawsuits in the U.S.83 and, eventually, to its withdrawal from
the market.84 However, the whole-cell vaccine is still used in developing
countries, because it is inexpensive, effective, and substantially safer than going
unvaccinated." The WHO, interestingly, recommends whole-cell pertussis
so

Id. at 86.

81
82

Id. at 88.
See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2009), affd sub nom. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) ("Although the whole-cell vaccine effectively reduced pertussis
infections and deaths associated with these infections, it was also linked to a variety of adverse
events.").
See, for example, Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d 233; Jones by Jones v. Lederle Labs, 982 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.
1992).
See Valico v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 00-662V, 2002 WL 508344, at *3 n.4 (Fed. Cl.
Mar. 11, 2002) ("In the last several years, a new type of 'acellular' pertussis vaccine has become
available, and is now being substituted for the whole-cell pertussis vaccine in most diphtheriapertussis-tetanus inoculations in this country."); Elizabeth A. Breen, Note, A One Shot Deal The
NationalChildhood Vaine Injury Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 309, 313 n.35 (1999) (stating that
"the more dangerous whole-cell pertussis vaccine has all but completely yielded to the newer
acellular pertussis vaccination").
See, for example, Hitt Sharma et al., A Phase III, Randomi.Zed Controlled Study to Assess the Safety and
Immunogenidti of a Semi-Synthetic D:phtheria,Tetanus and Whole-Cell Pertussis Vacdne in Indian Infants, 30
VACCINE 6157, 6160 (2012) ("Due to reactogenicity temporally associated with whole-cell
component of the DTwP vaccines, several developed countries have started using acellular
pertussis (DTaP) vaccines in their routine immunization programme. However, the development
cost of the acellular vaccine is higher, the production more complex and the efficacy is not better
in comparison to whole-cell pertussis vaccines. Further, in developing countries, the DTwP

83
84

85
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vaccine as acceptable in developing countries, largely because "there is
insufficient marginal benefit to consider changing from wP [whole-cell
vaccines]" to more expensive acellular ones." This recommendation parallels the
WHO's recommendation for meningitis and epilepsy, which permitted different
standards in developed and developing countries for cost reasons, and diverges
from its recommendations for HIV and medical donations. The use of wholecell vaccines in other countries, in fact, motivated at least one call in the U.S. for
permitting the export of unapproved drugs.8 7
Another context where vaccine recommendations have diverged involves
the human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine. While HPV vaccination has become
commonplace in the U.S., its costs remain high. A recent law review article notes
the potential conflict between providing HPV vaccine and pursuing other
medical priorities in developing countries:
[T]he current high cost of HPV vaccination is an enormous obstacle for
developing countries. However, efforts are being made to develop
mechanisms to make HPV vaccines more affordable, especially for public
sector programs in low- and middle-income countries ... . [B]oth Merck
and GSK have promised to offer their vaccines to the public sectors of
developing countries at prices tiered to country income. Even with
concerted efforts to reduce HPV vaccine costs, however, developing
countries will likely face difficult decisions regarding whether to allocate
their limited financial resources to HPV immunization programs.88
The author then goes on to propose that international funding, such as that
provided by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to non-profit HPV
immunization initiatives, could ease the difficult choices the HPV vaccine poses
for developing countries." But even where international funding is available for
HPV vaccination, the developing country's citizens might prefer-reasonablyto use that same funding to pursue other health care priorities, as a recent letter
to the Lancet argues:
First, although the burden of cervical cancer in low-income and middleincome countries is substantial (3.8 million disability-adjusted life-years
[DALYs]), it ranks well behind that of other vaccine- preventable diseases

86

reactogenicity issue is not generally seen as a major problem. Therefore, in such countries with
limited resources, whole-cell pertussis remains the vaccine of choice.").
Pertussis Vaccines: WHO Position Paper-Recommendations,29 VACCINE 2355,2355-56 (2011).

87

See Biological Products; Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids; Implementation of Eficacy Review, 70 Fed. Reg.
75018, 75020 (Dec. 19, 2005) ("The comment noted that medical practices in other countries may
differ from those in the United States and that in some countries Pertussis Immune Globulin
(Human) plays an important role in the augmentation of therapy with antibiotics in young, very ill
infants with pertussis.").

88

Gregory D. Zimet, PotentialBarriers to HPV Immuni-ation: From Pubhc Health to PersonalChoice, 35
AM.J.L. & MED. 389, 395 (2009).

89

See id.
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such as tetanus (8.3 million DALYs) and measles (23 million DALYs).
Second, the effectiveness of the HPV vaccine against cervical cancer is still
unknown. This uncertainty concerns African populations in particular, with
their high HIV prevalence. Third, to remain cost-effective in GAVI-eligible
[Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization-eligible] countries, the
costs for a vaccinated individual should not exceed US$10 for the three
doses. This cost contrasts unfavourably with the arguably lowest price
negotiated so far-$16.95 per dose.90
Policymakers in developing countries may also worry that once initial funding
for HPV vaccination dries up, the developing country may end up worse off
than if it had never taken the funding, because the vaccination program will be
difficult to terminate.91

III. GRANTING RIGHTS TO EXPENSIVE TREATMENTS
While the debates above focus on particular interventions and conditions,
debates over the right to health take a more general perspective. The
International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
defines this right as "the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health."92 The ICESCR's conception of the right
to health as a right to maximum health parallels the WHO's similar definition.9 3
Other influential human rights documents have adopted similar conceptions of
the right to health as a right to maximal health. 94 So, too, have human rights

91

Nobila Ouedraogo et al., Letter, Human PapillomavirusVaccination in Africa, 378 LANCiET 315, 31516 (2011).
See id. at 316 ("When the donations are drained off, GAVI will be in a difficult position:

92

terminating this highly publicised programme will be unpopular.... It would be a tragedy if
funds were shifted from proven, cost-effective vaccines and the strengthening of health systems
to new but costly vaccines of unknown effectiveness.").
ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 12.

90

93

S'ee Puneet K. Sandhu, Comment, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can the United States Iearnfrom
Foreign Models of Health RightsJuriprudence?,95 CAL. L. Rv. 1151,1158 (2007) ("The World Health
Organization (WHO) Constitution names '[tlhe enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health' as a 'fundamental rightij of every human being'.") (quoting CONSTITUTION OF THE
WORL
HuALTH ORGANIZATION
(1946), available at http://www.who.int/governance/
eb/whoconstitution-en.pdf.

94

See, for example, European Social Charter art. 11, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, rev'd May 3,
1996,
available
at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/
ESCCollectedTexts-en.pdf ("Everyone has the right to benefit from any measures enabling him
to enjoy the highest possible standard of health attainable."); African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter") art. 16, June 27, 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982), available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr ("Every individual shall have the
right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.").
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documents dedicated to the protection of particular vulnerable groups."
Activists, policymakers, and scholars have praised this conception."
The ICESCR defines only the right to health in maximal terms." In
contrast, it defines the right to food in adequacy terms, and does the same for
the right to shelter." Likewise, the right to work entitles workers to "just and
favourable conditions of work" which provide "a decent living for themselves
and their families," not to maximal pay or minimal hours." Other rights, like the
rights to education, social insurance, and cultural participation, as well as the
right to benefit from science, are left open-ended."oo Further, the right to health
generates a negative duty "to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with

95

96

See, for example, Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
("States Parties
recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and
to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health."); Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities art. 25, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml ("States Parties recognize that
persons with disabilities have the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health without discrimination on the basis of disability."); United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, 46 I.L.M. 1013
((Sept. 13, 2007), art. 24, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
DRIPS-en-pdf ("Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health."). See generally Virginia A. Leary, The Right to
Health in International Human Rights Iaw, I HEALTH & HuM. RTs. 24, 32-33 (1994) (discussing
various statements of the right to health).
See, for example, Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Human Right to Health: A Right to The "Highest Attainable
Standard of Health," 31 HASTINGS CTR. RiP. 29, 29-30 (2001) (praising the ICESCR definition);
Matti Hayry & Heta Hayry, Health Care As a Right, Fairnessand Medical Resources, 4 BiOTHIcs 1, 21
(1990) (arguing in favor of realizing the right to the highest attainable standard of health by
shifting resources from nonmedical "purposes which are, on reflection, far less important than
the prolongation of life and the improvement of health").

7

See Amir Attaran, Human Rsghts and Biomedical Research Fundingfor the Developing World: Discovering
State Obligations under the Right to Health, 4 HEALTH & Hum. RTS. 26, 31 (1999) ("The Article 12
right is tremendously ambitious in scope. It provides that the right to health inures to 'everyone'
and that everyone should enjoy the 'highest attainable standard' of well-being. No other right in
the ICESCR is framed in such superlative language.")

98

See ICESCR, suqpra note 10, art. 11 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.") (emphasis
added).

99 Id. art. 6.
1oo See id. arts. 9 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to
social security, including social insurance."), 13 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to education."), 15 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications.").
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the right to health" (the "obligation to respect") as well as a positive duty to
promote health (the "obligation to fulfill").101
In the next three subsections, I discuss three areas of case law where lowand middle-income countries have faced the challenge of balancing this
maximalist right to health against cost considerations.
A. Soobramoney
In 1997, the Constitutional Court of South Africa decided its first case
concerning the right-to-health provisions of the South African Constitution. The
appellant, Thiagraj Soobramoney, sought access to renal dialysis for which a
state hospital had found him ineligible due to his poor prognosis and the limited
resources available. Soobramoney alleged that the hospital's decision violated his
rights under Section 27(3) of the South African Constitution, which provides
that "[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment," and Section 11,
which stipulates a right to life.10 2 The Court found that Soobramoney's needs
were not emergency needs, but rather needs for the treatment of an ongoing,
chronic illness. As such, the Court decided that his claims instead fell under the
provisions of Sections 27(1) and 27(2), which obligate the government to take
reasonable measures "within its available resources" to enable everyone to access
health care services. After analyzing the reasons the government offered (which
had prevailed in the lower court), the Court concluded that the government had
made a rational decision not to treat Soobramoney, and that ordering the
government to treat him would be contrary to the needs of other people whom
the government also had a duty to assist.103
The Soobramoney decision was controversial among activists and academics,
many of whom argued that the Court could and should have done more for
Soobramoney. Human rights lawyers and the public pointed to the extremity of
Soobramoney's plight;104 academics called Soobramoney "a rather timid approach
to social and economic rights""0 s and charged that "[i]n acknowledging that a

101

OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMNI'R FOR HUM. RTS., THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 25

102

(2008).
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwa-Zulu-Natal, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (S. Aft.).

103

104

105

Id. Tf 11, 36.
See, for example, Richard J. Goldstone, A South African Perspective on Social and Economic Rights, 13
HuM. RTs. BRIEF 4, 5 (2005) ("The Court was criticized by much of the media for effectively
sentencing Soobramoney to death."); Emily Bazelon, After the Revolution, LEGAL AFF. (Jan./Feb.
available
at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2003/
2003),
featurebazelon-janfeb2003.msp (suggesting that "most human rights lawyers read the majority
opinion [in .Soobramoney] as a major disappointment").
Dennis M. Davis, Socioeconomic Rights: Do They Deliver the Goods?, 6 ICON 687, 692 (2008).
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person's wealth determined whether he would live or die, yet failing to interpret
the constitutional rights to life and health to avoid this outcome, the Court
missed an important opportunity to give meaning to the new social contract."o0
B. Treatment Action Campaign
Rather than representing a break with an under-ambitious first attempt in
Soobramoney, as some have argued, 07 the South African Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC) case represented a continuation of the same universalization norm
applied to a different policy. And, as often happens, a different policy produced
a different result.
In TAC, the Constitutional Court considered whether to require the
government to make nevirapine, a highly-active antiretroviral drug, available
widely to mothers in order to combat mother-to-child HIV transmission."o The
TAC suit responded to the government's policy of making the drug only
available in a very few pilot sites. The government's arguments focused on the
desirability of providing nevirapine in the context of an integrated HIV
treatment strategy (which would be possible at the pilot sites),10' whereas the
plaintiffs contended that there was no point in preventing patients who would
not be able to access the drug at the pilot sites from accessing the drug
altogether."o The Court ultimately concluded that the government had an
obligation to expand access to nevirapine beyond the pilot sites."'
What differences between the situations in TAC and Soobramoney produced
this very different outcome? I believe there were two primary factors. First, the
TAC suit was brought by a group, rather than a single individual. If the plaintiffs
prevailed, a large group of similarly situated and poorly-off people would be
helped. It has been suggested that the TAC decision "saved tens of thousands of
lives," 12 whereas even if the plaintiff in Soobramoney had prevailed, only his own
life would have been (temporarily) saved. Second, the TAC case did not require
the government to bear all the costs of the requested intervention. Instead, the
private sector also stepped up to bear some of the costs: as the South African
106

Jeanne M. Woods, justiciable Social Rights as a Criique of the Liberal Paradigm,38 Tx.INT'L L.J.
763,

107

Seefor example, id. at 786.
See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Aft.),
[hereinafter
qAC].

783 (2003).
108

109 See id.

$
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16.
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See id. 18.

III

See id.
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Ministerof Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (fAQ (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC), ESCR-NET, available at
http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/403050.

68.

Winter 2015

58 1

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Constitutional Court noted, "the manufacturers of [n]evirapine offered to make
it available to the South African government free of charge for a period of five
years."' 1 3
C. Tutelas
What might have happened if the South African Constitutional Court had
found in Soobramoney's favor? Many Latin American courts have taken an
approach of this kind when addressing the right to health, and we might learn
from their experience. I will argue that the Latin American cases-despite some
praise from human rights commentators-ultimately illustrate that recognizing
claims like Soobramoney's would have inevitably proven so costly and timeconsuming as to be unworkable, and would have actually worked to undermine
the rights of the worst-off in society.
One such example is that of Colombian tutelas-legal proceedings by which
Colombian citizens can enjoin the national government to pay for lifesaving
medical care. Colombia's experience is a microcosm of the problems Latin
American nations have faced when permitting individual citizens to bring rightto-health suits against the government. In the mid-1990s-just as the South
African Constitutional Court was working out its approach to the right to
health-the Colombian Constitutional Court elected to permit tutelas.
As might be expected from the South African reaction to Soobramoney, the
tutela system's willingness to cater to the needs of identifiable and seriously
unwell individuals attracted public praise.114 However, as we might equally
expect, the system has proven exceptionally expensive."' In Colombia, the
113

114

115

14C, supra note

108,f 19.
ee,for example, Rodrigo Uprimny, Should Courts Enforce Social Rights? The Experience of the Colombian
ConstitutionalCourt, in COURTS AND SocIAL. TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMocRAcIu's 127, 141
(Roberto Gargarella et al. eds., 2006) ("Others, however, as beneficiaries of these rulings, find in
the Court's progressivism a means for satisfying a basic need of such magnitude as health, and for
improving their life quality in an important way.") (summarizing Salom6n Kalmanovitz, lias
consecuentias economicas de losfallos de la Corte Constitutional,276 Economia Colombiana 124 (1999));
Everaldo Lamprea & Tatiana Andia, Local Maladies, Global Remedies: Rethinking Right to
Health Duties (unpublished manuscript presented to the Linda Randall Meier Global justice
Workshop,
Stanford
University, May 21,
2010), at 2,
available at http://iisdb.stanford.edu/evnts/6170/GlobalJusticc May_21_2010.pdf ("Paying for this type of
expensive life-saving pharmaceuticals is, in itself, a remarkable achievement for a government of a
developing country. Unlike millions of other cases around the developing and developed world,
Colombians afflicted by excruciating and highly onerous medical conditions have, in the last
resort, a judicial action that may allow them to have access to such expensive, life-saving
goods.").
See Uprimny, supra note 114, at 142 (arguing that the tutela system undermines public health
interventions like childhood immunization in order to treat high-profile cases); see also Maria Paula
Saffon, Can Constitutional Courts Be Counterhegemonic Powers vis-a-vis Neoliberalism? The Case of the
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system more than tripled health care expenditures in a single year-between
1998 and 1999.116 This rise in health care costs continued over time: as Everaldo
Lamprea and Tatiana Andia's research shows, "the cost of health litigation
climbed from U.S. $1.48 million in 2001 up to U.S. $344 million in 2008."1" Not
only did health care expenditures rise staggeringly, but the court system also
became overburdened: "[IWn 2004 ... 1 of every 597 Colombian citizens used
the basic rights injunction for the protection of basic rights (Tutela) in order to
obtain health-related goods and services,""8 and by 2008, there had been more
than 650,000 right to health actions brought."' Some have argued that the tutela
system is a valuable counteractive to neoliberal policies that spend money on
military might and corporate tax breaks rather than directly on the worst-off.120
But the greater resources that flow to the individuals winning tutela judgments
have frequently-as many feared would have happened in South Africa had the
Soobramoney court not ruled as it did-come not from increased tax revenue or
cuts in other sectors, but from cannibalizing less visible but crucial parts of the
health sector, like childhood immunizations, 121 and have flowed to the middle
class rather than to the working class and the poor. 1 22 Similar problems have
occurred in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Brazil.1 23

116

Colombian Constitutional Court, 5 SEATnLE J. Soc. JUST. 533, 547-48 (2007) (noting that the tutela
system more than tripled health care expenditures between 1998 and 1999, that the system is
unsustainable because of lack of state resources, and that many have criticized tutelas for
inefficiently directing money to high-cost interventions; nonetheless praising the tutela system
because it has concretely helped some citizens). Seegenerally Alicia Ely Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera,
Judidal Protection of the Right to Health in Colombia: From Social Demands to Individual Claims to Public
Debate, 33 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. Riw. 431 (2010) (describing the evolution of the tutela
system in Colombia).
See Saffon, supra note 115, at 547-48.
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Lamprea & Andia, supra note 114, at 6 (noting also that "the cost of treatments and medications
that are not included in the Basic Health Plan paid to private HMOs by the tax-financed fund
FOSYGA escalated from U.S.$ 2.8 million [sic] in 2001 to U.S.$ 605.3 million [sic] in 2008").
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Id. at 4.

119

Id at 4-5.
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See,for example, Saffon, supra note 115, at 547-48.
See sources cited supra note 115.
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122 See David Landau, The Realit ofSodal Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT'l. L.J. 189, 215 (2012).
123 See generall Fabiola Sulpino Vieira, Right to Health IJtgations:A Discussion on the Observance of the
Prinales of Brai/'s Health System, 42 Ri.v. SAUDE PUBLICA 365 (2008) (criticizing the Brazilian
Supreme Court for issuing rulings guaranteeing access to medicines that ignored resource scarcity
and cost-effectiveness); see Alicia Ely Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera, How Do Courts Set Health Poliy?
The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 6 PLoS MlD. 147, 149 (2009), available at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fournal.pmed.1000032
(observing that "[i]n Brazil, thousands of court cases have been brought since 1992 relating to
access to medications-many of which are highly costly and not included in Brazil's national
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Noah Novogrodsky effectively summarizes the difference between the
group focus of a case like TAC and the individual focus of the tutela cases:
One characteristic of this shift has been the emphasis on demands for
treatment as an individual rather than a collective right. Rightly or wrongly,
the interest in ARVs [antiretroviral medications] has focused attention on
individual, biomedical needs rather than public health requirements. Where
"[p]ublic health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the
conditions of people to be healthy," treatment is essentially an atomized,
clinical exercise. While many theorists insist that the right to health is better
understood as a society-level collective right focused on the underlying
determinants of health, not specific case-by-case interventions, the
treatment cases use the provision of ARVs to enforce individual claims to
dignity and sustainable treatment.124
Among the cases that Novogrodsky cites as examples of this individual-focused
view are tutela cases. What I want to suggest is that Novogrodsky is far too
optimistic in thinking that individual-focused cases like the tutela cases could be
able to realize "sustainable treatment."' 25 As we see above, they instead have led
to runaway costs and an overburdened legal system.
Another crucial difference between TAC and the tutela cases is the source
of the resources being given to the worst-off. Novogrodsky mistakenly reads
TAC as holding that "states parties must make 'every effort' using 'all' available
resources to ensure fulfillment of [the right to health.]"' 26 But in TAC,
pharmaceutical companies made nevirapine available to the government for free.
It is by no means clear from the TAC decision that the South African
Constitutional Court would have directed the government to buy nevirapine at
the market price for all mothers with HIV/AIDS.
In contrast, in the tutela cases, the private sector (rather than the state) was
not asked to contribute anything to ease the plight of the worst off. Instead, as
Lamprea and Andia observe, Colombia acquiesced in extraordinarily high
pharmaceutical prices:
Colombia is a country with some of the most expensive pharmaceuticals in
the region. Two [WHO] and Health Action International (HAI) studies
confirm this fact. The first study compared Colombia's essential medicine
prices with those of Bolivia, Peni, Ecuador, Venezuela and Nicaragua, and
concluded that Colombia has the highest prices of brand name

124

health plan-resulting in distortions of the health budget," and noting similar practices in
Argentina and Costa Rica).
Noah Novogrodsky, The Duty of Treatment: Human Ri hts and the HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 12 YAIE
HUM. RTs. & Div. L.J. 1, 41 (2009) (quoting Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The
HighestAttainableStandard:Advancing a Collective Human Right to Public Health, 37 CotuM. Hum. RTs.
L. REv. 101, 121 n.78 (2005)).
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pharmaceuticals in the Region. The second study, an international price
"snapshot" of Ciprofloxacin (a commonly used off-patent antibiotic) in 93
countries concluded that "Colombia showed the largest brand premium,
with the originator brand priced at 60 times the lowest priced generic.
Colombia also had the highest treatment cost for originator brand
ciprofloxacin in the private sector."
This overpricing of pharmaceuticals due to deregulation proved to be toxic
when the wave of health-related litigation forced the government to use
taxpayer money to pay for high-cost exclusive pharmaceuticals produced by
Big Pharma companies .... [I]n 2008 the cost of the Top Ten Bestseller
high-cost pharmaceuticals in Colombia-many of which were obtained by
patients through health-litigation and were paid by the tax-financed fund
Fosyga-reached US$ 210 million [sic]. Moreover, nine of these ten
products are sold in Colombia at prices that are between 200% and 540%
higher than the ones paid in Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico,
Panami, Peri and Venezuela. 127
Andia and Lamprea's research suggests that Colombia's strategy was the polar
opposite of South Africa's. Rather than strictly limiting individual right-to-health
claims, Colombia welcomed them; rather than having the private sector
contribute to the costs of essential medicines, the government absorbed the
entire cost of each individual rights claim granted. 128
IV.

CAN LIMITING ACCESS BE JUSTIFIED?

States and international legal actors can prevent access to less expensive,
less effective treatments directly through bans or indirectly by emptying
government coffers to pay for individually demanded expensive treatments.
Nonetheless, where a less expensive and effective intervention, like stavudine
treatment for HIV or a used pacemaker, is more cost-effective-it can treat
more people and provide a larger net medical benefit for a given sum of
money-the moral case in its favor is simple and compelling. Making it possible
for more people to live longer, or allowing more people to experience a higher
quality of life, better respects the value of each person's life than would helping
fewer people with the same resources. Choosing a medically less effective but
more cost-effective intervention often makes a better outcome possible. As one
of stavudine's proponents put it, "[a] minister of health or donor faced with the
decision to treat two people with a moderately toxic drug or one with a relatively
safe regimen, with the other person definitely dying of AIDS, faces very little
choice."' 29
127

Lamprea & Andia, supra note 114, at 15.

128

See id
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W.D. Francois Venter et al., l;w-Dose Stavudine Trials:A Public Health Prioriyfor Developing Countries,
13 S. AFR.J. HIV MED. 20, 21 (2012).
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This section will focus on three types of responses to this simple argument
against limiting access to less expensive, less effective treatments. These
responses appeal to special obligations that physicians owe patients, to the value
of expressing disapproval of an unjust situation, and to the potentially good
long-term consequences of mandating the same treatments in developing
countries as are provided in developed ones.
A.

Special Obligations

Choices about whether to help specific individuals (like Thiagraj
Soobramoney or Pauline Talty) vindicate their right to the highest attainable
standard of health, or to help individuals in developing countries secure the
same medications that are provided in developed countries, frequently involve
appeals to the importance of special obligations owed those in need. The
physician-activist Paul Farmer makes this point eloquently:
Over the past decade and against a steady current of naysaying, we have
channeled significant resources to the destitute sick in Haiti, Peru, Mexico,
and Boston. We didn't argue that it was "cost-effective," nor did we
promise that such efforts would be replicable. We argued that it was the
right thing to do. It was the human rights thing to do.130
Were helping these patients costless, there would be little reason to resist
Farmer's claim that helping them was the right thing to do. But helping them is
not costless. In the cases I detail, the money, time, and medical resources spent
in order to provide specific individuals with the highest attainable standard of
health, or secure the highest-quality treatments, could almost certainly have
saved more lives if instead used to provide less effective (or more toxic)
treatments to more people.
Farmer's claim, however, could still be true if a special moral obligation
were to override the aforementioned justifications for helping more people. In
this subsection, I consider three potential sources of such an obligation: (1) the
duty not to harm; (2) the duty to rescue the sick; and (3) the duty of reciprocity.
1. The duty not to harm.
Many second-best treatments, such as stavudine, have more burdensome
side effects than more expensive alternatives. If these side effects were to
constitute harms, then aiding more people by providing them with stavudine
may also entail harming more people. And cases where aiding more people
requires causing harm seem more morally complex than those where aiding
some people requires failing to aid other people. In such cases, medical
130

Paul Farmer & Nicole Gastineau, Rethinking Health and Human Rights: Timefor a ParadigmShift, 30 J.
L. MED. & ETHics 655, 664 (2002).
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professionals' duty not to harm might potentially bar them from providing aid.1 3'
Many arguments against the export of unapproved drugs appeal to the claim that
providing these drugs would risk harming some of the patients who received
them.132
Whether side effects constitute harms depends on how we define harm.
Within what legal scholar Seana Shiffrin calls comparative models of harm,
someone suffers a harm when she is made worse off than she would have been
in some alternative scenario. 33 In comparative terms, stavudine does not harm
those who receive it even when they experience side effects, so long as these side
effects are less bad than the effects of untreated HIV. Since receiving
stavudine-despite its side effects-is better than suffering from untreated HIV,
stavudine benefits those who receive it rather than harming them. While
advocates of the comparative model might say that stavudine's side effects areconsidered on their own-barmful, they would deny that stavudine, all things
considered, harms patients with HIV. Similarly, they would deny that a successful
rescuer who injures the person she rescues harms that person. As Joel Feinberg
points out, "the rescuer-defendant did not cause a condition that was harmful
on balance, offset as it was by the overriding benefit of rescue ....

[H]e cannot

be said, therefore, to have harmed the [rescued person] (in the relevant full
sense) at all."' 34
Shiffrin herself endorses a noncomparative model of harm, rather than a
comparative model. On Shiffrin's view,
harm involves the imposition of a state or condition that directly or
indirectly obstructs, prevents, frustrates, or undoes an agent's cognizant
interaction with her circumstances and her efforts to fashion a life within
them that is distinctively and authentically hers-as more than merely that
which must be watched, marked, endured or undergone.135
The injuring rescuer clearly causes harm on Shiffrin's view, although he also
prevents harm. However, Shiffrin denies that causing a lesser harm to someone
in order to save her from a more serious harm generates a special obligation to
131 See, for example, N.J. Stat. Ann. §45:1-54 (West 2013) (mentioning "the medical dictum to first, do
no harm"); Finucan v. Md. State Bd. of Physician Quality Assur., 827 A.2d 176, 187 n.7 (Md.
App. 2003), afYd sub nom. Finucan v. Md. Bd. of Physician Quality Assur., 846 A.2d 377 (Md.
2004) (collecting cases discussing the "first, do no harm" maxim).
132 See, for example, Hatton, supra note 37, at 443 (noting that "the United States may find itself the
butt of international criticism if an exported unapproved new drug, unavailable to American
consumers, causes illness or deaths abroad").
133 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procmative Responsibiiy, and the Significance of Harm, 5
LEGAL THEORY 117,121 (1999).

134

Id. at 120 (quoting Joel Feinberg, Wrongful life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in
FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT 3, 27 (1992) (emphasis omitted)).

135

Id. at 123-24.
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rectify the lesser harm. Rather, Shiffrin concludes that "when a person is
unavailable for consent, it can be justified both to inflict a lesser harm upon her
to avert a greater harm, and to refrain from providing compensation or
apologies for one's act.""' Therefore, although Shiffrin and Feinberg disagree
about whether the injuring rescuer harms the rescuee, they agree that he owes no
compensation, because he does not worsen the rescuee's position. Case law
adopts a similar stance.'37
Arthur Applbaum seems to disagree with Shiffrin's conclusion, as well as
that of the comparativists, and grounds his intuition in an example:
[I]n Imperial Russia, young boys were sometimes impressed into the tsar's
army for many years of harsh, cruel, and dangerous service. Some parents,
to spare their sons this fate, would cut off the boys' trigger fingers at a very
young age .... [T]o cut off a boy's finger under the circumstances described
is to violate a right not to have one's person violated. Let us suppose that
the conditions of conscription amounted to involuntary servitude to a
tyrant, and so was a greater violation of these boys' rights .... Mhe parents
violate a lesser right of their child to prevent a greater violation by the tsar
of the rights of the same child.138
Applbaum concludes that "[s]uch a desperate choice is ghastly to contemplate,
and I cannot say with confidence that it is morally permissible."' I agree with
Applbaum that the choice is ghastly. But I cannot imagine why-in a case where
the child is certain to suffer a far worse fate-cutting off his finger would be
impermissible. Medical cases make this clear. Imagine, for instance, a child with
an osteosarcoma (cancer) of the leg that will metastasize unless the leg is
amputated.140 It is certainly ghastly to be put in a position where one must
choose between cutting a child's leg off or their dying of cancer-though
pediatric oncologists realize their choice of career will frequently put them in
such a position-but, once one is inescapably in such a position, doing what is
better for the patient seems clearly permissible.
136

Id. at 126.
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See, for example, Rodrigue v. United States, 968 F.2d 1430, 1434 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Good Samaritan
rule does not impose liability for mere negligent failure to confer a benefit, but only for
negligently making matters worse.'; United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1962)
("[]he negligence of the volunteer rescuer must worsen the position of the person in distress
before liability will be imposed."); see also Dov Waisman, Neglgence, Responsibility, and the Clumy
Samaritan:Is There a Fairness Rationalefor the Good Samaritan Immnunity?, 29 GA. ST. U. L. Ri~v. 609,
620 (2013) ("The injured party has traditionally been required to show that the ultimate result of
the rescuer's conduct was to place the injured party in aworse position than she would have been
in had that particular rescuer never intervened.") (emphasis omitted).
Arthur Isak Applbaum, Are Violations of Rights Ever Right?, 108 ETHICS 340, 349 (1998).
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Id. at 349.
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For discussion of such a case, see generally Turner v. Steriltek, Inc., No. M2006-01816-COA-R3CV, 2007 WL 4523157 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2007).
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Some side effects, however, actually make patients worse off than they
would have been were they never treated. For instance, stavudine occasionally causes
fatal lactic acidosis.141 The patient who experiences this side effect is in a
different position from the rescuee injured during her rescue or the
osteosarcoma patient saved by amputation, or even the stavudine recipient
whose HIV is managed at the cost of disfigurement. For the patient who dies of
stavudine-induced lactic acidosis, what was ex ante expected to be the
substitution of a lesser harm for a great harm turned out ex post to be the
substitution of an even greater harm for the great harm. The same would be true
in Applbaum's case if we know in advance that some boys who have their
trigger fingers cut off-although we do not know which boys-would not have
been impressed by the tsar anyway, or in the osteosarcoma case if osteosarcomas
ever go into spontaneous remission.
Where we know that a treatment's side effects will prove to be more
burdensome for some individuals than the condition it purports to prevent
would have been, we cannot appeal to Shiffrin's justification of the treatment:
that it harms people but in so doing saves them from a greater harm. However,
even the most serious harms stavudine causes are the sort of harms that we
are-on many views-permitted to impose in order to prevent greater harm.
This is so for several reasons:
*
*
*
*

Receiving stavudine rather than receiving nothing is ex -ante in
each recipient's interest, even though it proves not to be in some
recipients' interest ex post.
Recipients consented to take the risk of side effects in exchange
for the prospect of medical benefit.
Patient deaths from stavudine-related side effects are not causally
upstream from the benefits to the patients stavudine saves, nor
are those deaths necessary to realizing stavudine's benefits.
Stavudine-induced deaths are foreseen rather than intended.

Some of these factors are arguably sufficient on their own to justify the potential
imposition of harm. The ethicist Frances Kamm, for instance, argues that a
harm being consented to and in one's ex ante interest can justify imposing it.
Kamm motivates her view by presenting the "Disease Case," where someone
can reduce their chance of dying of a deadly disease by taking a drug that will kill
them if they were among the few people immune to the disease. Taking the drug

141

See Joel E. Gallant, Drug Resistance after Failure of Initial Antiretroviral Therapy in Resource-limited
Countries, 44 CuN. INFECTIous Disi.Asi;s 453, 453 (2007).
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is ex ante in the person's interest, though having done so may not be in their
interest ex post.' 42
Kamm also argues that it is morally appropriate to redirect a danger away
from a greater number of people and toward a lesser number of people-even
non-consenting people.'43 She contrasts such redirection cases with cases where
someone harms a lesser number of people in order to later reach a greater
number of people and save them from harm.'" In the latter case, the harm we
impose is causally upstream of the harm we prevent and is therefore more
objectionable.'45 Others reach a similar conclusion, but by appealing to our
intentions rather than to the causal structure of the situation. Warren Quinn, for
instance, argues that the permissibility of harming the lesser number in
redirection cases stems in part from the harm's being foreseen rather than
intended.146
For these reasons, I believe that-at least where consent exists-adopting
a policy that will inevitably cause the sort of harm that second-best treatment
imposes is clearly permissible, particularly where this policy could be predicted
to benefit more people than it harms. Such a policy would parallel the
negligence, as opposed to strict liability, structure of rescuer liability in much of
Western case law. If a rescuer's actions could ex ante have been expected to
benefit the rescuee (that is, if the rescuer was not negligent), the rescuer is not
required to compensate the rescuee, even where the attempted rescue leaves the
rescuee worse off ex post.147 Indeed, many states have adopted statutes shielding

142

143

See FRANCES M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY, VOL. 2: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND STATUS 293
(1996).
See FRANCES M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE HARM
138-43 (2007) (discussing Philippa Foot, The Problem of-Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Efect, in
ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIvES 177-85 (Jay Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds.,
1984)).
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See KANI, INTRICATE ETHICS, supra note 143, at 147-48.
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See i.
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See Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 PH IL.
Rv. 287, 287 (1989).
See, for example, Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 21 P.3d 667, 672 (Utah Ct. App.
2001) ("[Olur construction of section 324(b) requires a plaintiff to prove... that the plaintiffs
ending up in a worse position is due to the defendant's failure to take reasonable care given the
facts the defendant knew or should have known at the time.") (citing RESTATEMENT (SIcOND) OF
TORTS 5 324(b) (1965)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 44
(2012) ("This Section eschews strict liability when a rescuer leaves another worse off, instead
requiring that the actor exercise reasonable care not to leave the other in a worse position upon
termination.").
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rescuers from liability even when they are ordinarily negligent in attempting
rescue, so long as they are not grossly negligent.148
Even if it is permissible to impose the harms second-best drugs like
stavudine cause, that these drugs carry an increased risk of harm might justify
someone refusing, on conscientious grounds, to provide them. Refusal to be
involved in harm may be defensible even where refusal to take on minor
burdens would be morally monstrous. To see why, return to Applbaum's case of
the tsar. If you have the option to move from Russia to Finland and have only a
slight preference to stay in Russia, it would seem monstrous to ignore the fact
that leaving Russia will save your son from impressment into the tsar's army. But
it does not seem monstrous to refuse to cut off your son's finger in order to save
him from impressment. If you cut off your son's finger, you become the
proximate cause of the pain he suffers. Even though the tsar may be morally
responsible for that harm, since he placed you in the ghastly situation you now
face,149 morality may not require us to take on that kind of responsibility: to, as
Michael Walzer puts it, "dirty our hands" with the blood of innocents.'
Such concerns, I believe, can excuse mere bystanders from otherwise
obligatory rescues: I am not sure morality can require you to cut off a stranger's
trigger finger in order to save that stranger from death at the tsar's hands. But in
the case of those who already owe a professional duty of care, dirty hands
concerns seem less relevant. Return, for instance, to the osteosarcoma case.
Even though it may be ghastly to imagine cutting off one's own child's leg, it
seems clear that a parent should authorize a physician to perform the
amputation-and, indeed, were she to have the expertise and be the only one
able, to perform the amputation herself.
I believe that physicians and institutional actors stand in a similar position
to parents. A physician, a health care administrator, or a state may not refuse to
save someone from an avoidable harm because doing so might entail doing
harm. As with the osteosarcoma and vaccine cases, if providing an intervention
can be ex ante expected to protect the patient from harm, and the patient
consents to the intervention, a desire to avoid causal involvement in harm
cannot justify refusing to protect someone from a far greater harm.
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See Waisman, supra note 137, at 611 ("By 1980, all fifty states had enacted 'Good Samaritan
immunity' statutes shielding medical professionals (and, in most states, laypersons) from liability
for ordinary negligence committed in the course of a voluntary, good-faith attempt to assist
someone in an emergency.").
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See KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS, supra note 143, at 309.
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See generaly Michael Walzer, PolificalAcdon: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 73 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160
(1973); see also KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS, supra note 143, at 325.
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This point finds additional support in a claim by Thomas Nagel. Nagel
argues that the distinction between harming and failing to benefit applies
differently to institutions than to individuals:
The lack of a washing machine by the family next door is not even in part
my doing or my responsibility just because I could have bought them one.
But I believe that such restrictions on what is usually called negative
responsibility do not apply in the same way to our relations to one another
through our common social institutions, especially an involuntary institution

such as the state, together with its economic structure. We are responsible,
through the institutions which require our support, for the things they could
5
have prevented as well as for the things they actively cause.' '

Even if individuals enjoy a permission to refuse to aid when doing so would
involve them in harm, the same is not true of institutions. Since the
institutions-unlike the individuals-would bear responsibility for the deaths of
those who go unaided, they have a duty to prevent those deaths even when
doing so involves doing harm.

2. The duty to rescue.
Albert Jonsen describes the "Rule of Rescue" as an imperative that
operates analogously to the duty not to harm and limits efforts to save the most

lives:
Our moral response to the imminence of death demands that we rescue the
doomed. We throw a rope to the drowning, rush into the burning buildings
to snatch the entrapped, dispatch teams to search for the snowbound. This
rescue morality spills over into medical care, where our ropes are artificial
hearts, our rush is the mobile critical care unit, our teams the transplant
services.152
Jonsen's claim here is that we owe a special obligation to those faced with
imminent harm. Ignoring someone faced with imminent harm would wrong
them, and that wrong would not be canceled out-though it might be

outweighed-by saving more people from a harm that is less imminent.
There are three reasons, however, why the Rule of Rescue does not direct
us to provide world-class care to a few rather than second-best care to many.
First, not all these trade-offs occur in rescue situations. Second, some of these
cases involve tradeoffs between different rescues-for instance, the Rule of

151

152

THoMAs NAGiEi., EQUALITY AND PARTIALIT'

84 (1991). See Govind C. Persad, Note, Risk,
Evegyday Intuitions, and the Institutional Value of Tort Law, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1452 (2010)
("[I]nstitutions such as governments may be so intimately involved with all causal interactions that
there is no normative difference between their positive and negative responsibility for an
outcome.'".
Albert R. Jonsen, Bentham in a Box: Technology Assessment and lealth CareAllocation, 14 J. L. MIHD. &
1-IEALTH CARE 172, 174 (1986).
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Rescue may count in favor of rescuing someone using a second-best method,
rather than leaving them to die. Third, and most significantly, the moral
relevance of the Rule of Rescue-notwithstanding its psychological pull-is
dubious in cases where rescue involves sacrificing something morally important.
The clearest examples of the Rule of Rescue, like Peter Singer's case where
saving someone from a shallow pond requires merely muddying one's shoes,"
involve cases where rescuing someone in need does not jeopardize anything else
of importance. But rescuing someone by providing them tenofovir or a new
pacemaker, when doing so means that others will go without any treatment at
all, does involve a serious moral tradeoff. Rescuing some with a high-cost
treatment means leaving fewer resources available for others. As Nancy Jecker
observes, that the duty to rescue may trump a rescuer's trivial projects does not
mean that it has purchase against the weighty though less urgent needs of third
parties. In discussing Singer's view and that of Tom Beauchamp, Jecker notes
that
Both of these approaches appeal to beneficence to support RR [the Rule of
Rescue] in trade-off situations where the benefits to the rescued individual
are likely to be greater than the harms to that person and to the one
rescuing. However, the focus of the analysis remains quite narrow,
emphasizing a single individual requiring rescue. Justice . . . deals more
broadly with the situation we actually face when we attempt to apply RR to
a group of needy people. For example, in health care, many individuals are
at risk of loss of or damage to health if they do not receive healthcare
resources. Justice helps us to decide whom to rescue, and how to prioritize
rescue versus other types of healthcare investments.1 54
Others have argued that, in a situation with clear tradeoffs (that is, where health
care resources are scarce), we should prioritize those who are going tobe worst
off overall over those who need help soonest."' To see why, imagine a
community where people receive their monthly pay at different times. Directing
all our aid to the people who are poorest at this moment ignores the fact that
they may simply be poorest because they are furthest from their payday, while
others will be as poor or even poorer later in the month. We should instead
employ our aid to keep as many workers out of poverty as possible. The WHO
seems to recognize similar considerations when making recommendations about
where ambulances should be deployed:

153 See Peter Singer, Famine,Afluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231-33 (1972).
154 Nancy S.Jecker, The Problem with Rescue Medidne, 38J. MED. & PHILOs. 64,74 (2013).
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For a survey of such views, see 1. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221,
252 (2013); see also Govind Persad et al., Prinilesfor Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 373
LANCET 423, 425 (2009) (criticizing views that allocate scarce resources to those who are currently
sickest).
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Although a fully fitted and equipped ambulance vehicle complete with
trained paramedics delivers better outcomes, ethical and equity
considerations dictate that before this vehicle is made available to an elite
population in the urban areas, basic transportation must be assured for all
who need emergency transportation and care.156
Perfectly realizing our duty to rescue in individual cases, the WHO seems to
concede here, must take a back seat to ensuring that all patients have a decent
chance of being helped.
3. The duty of reciprocity.
Some legal commentators have argued that developed-country researchers
owe clinical trial participants in developing countries a higher standard of care
than those participants would otherwise have received (and, indeed, may owe
them the developed world standard of care).' 7 Two prominent justifications for
this heightened standard of care make the case that special solicitude for
research participants is necessary either to avoid exploiting them' or to fulfill
special obligations researchers have acquired.'15
This argument is controversial even in the research arena.'16 But it should
have no purchase where medical care is concerned. Providing patients a lower
standard of care in order to reach more patients-unlike providing trial
particzjtantsa lower standard-does not exploit the patients who receive secondbest care, nor use them as a means. Rather, each aid recipient receives the
highest standard of care that is consistent with fellow aid recipients receiving
similarly good care. Nor is it plausible that we owe special obligations to some
patients but not others, in the way that we might owe special obligations to trial
participants that exceed our obligations to their co-nationals. Each patient in a
developing country stands on the same footing as every other.
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WORLD BANK, DIsnAsE CONTROL PRIORITIES IN DEVILOPING COUNTRIES 1268 (Dean T.
Jamison et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006).
See, for example, Alice K. Page, Ethical Issues in International Biomedical Research: An Overview, 37 J.
HEALTH L. 629, 642 (2004); Rid & Schmidt, supra note 11, at 146.
See James V. Lavery, Putting InternationalResearch Ethics Guidelines to Work for The Benefit of Developing
Countries,4 YALEJ. HEALTH PoLY L. & ETHICS 319, 320-22 (2004).

See Henry S. Richardson, Incidental Findings and Ancillary-Care Obligations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
256, 263 (2008).
See, for example, David Orentlicher, Universality and Its Limits: When Research Ethics Can Reflect Local
Circumstances, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 403, 403 (2002) ("It does not follow that, if a research study
is unethical in the United States, it is also unethical in Kenya. Rather, one can accept the same
principles of research ethics for Kenya and the United States and still conclude that those
universal principles allow for different studies in different countries because of differences in local
circumstances.").
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B. Global Justice
Even if failing to provide the developed-world standard of care worldwide
does not violate obligations to the particular individuals who receive second-best
care-as the previous subsection argued-providing second-best care might
appear to violate principles of global justice. Given that all human beings are
equal in some morally relevant sense, some complain that treating them with
different medications fails to appropriately recognize the value of human
equality."' Some likewise complain that interpreting the right to health as an
adequacy right will still allow the wealthy to buy health care that goes beyond the
adequacy standard, such as costly but lifesaving medical procedures.1 62
However, this suggestion does not hold up under inspection, even in a
situation where all countries are receiving the resources to which justice entitles
them. First, other goods-education and housing, for instance-serve as "social
determinants of health," which contribute to health as much as, or even more
than, health care does. 163 Second, achieving decent standards in education,
housing, infrastructure, and working conditions seems as important as
promoting health. 164 Third, as Amy Gutmann argues, it can be permissible to
invest resources in even nonessential goals at the expense of maximizing health:
[A]bove some less-than-maximum level in the provision of opportunity
goods, it seems reasonable for people to value what, for want of a better
term, one might call "quality of life" goods: cultural, recreational,
noninstrumental educational goods, and even consumer amenities. A society
161 Seefor example, sources cited supranote 37 and accompanying text.
162
Seeforexample, Woods, supra note 106, at 783.
163

164

See Emily Whelan Parento, Health Equity, Healthy People 2020, and Coercive Legal Mechanisms as
NecessaUfor the Achievement of Both, 58 Loy. L. Rv. 655, 713 (2012) ("[N]o amount of health care
can provide population health in the absence of measures to remedy disparities in the social
determinants of health."); see also Col.o. Rt'v. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-2202 (West 2014) ("'Social
determinants of health' means life-enhancing resources, such as food, housing, economic and
social relationships, transportation, education, and health care, whose distribution across
populations effectively determines the length and quality of life."); WASH. RL.v. CODE ANN.
§ 43.20.025 (West 2014) ("'Social determinants of health' means those elements of social structure
most closely shown to affect health and illness, including at a minimum, early learning, education,
socioeconomic standing, safe housing, gender, incidence of violence, convenient and affordable
access to safe opportunities for physical activity, healthy diet, and appropriate health care
services.").
See Georgia J. Maheras, Vermont Health Reform, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 61, 66 (2013) ("The
increase in health care costs limits the ability of Vermonters and the state to pay for other things
such as education, transportation, and non-medical emergency services."); Scott D. Litman, Health
Care Reform for the T'wenty-FirstCentuy: The Need for a Federaland State Partnership,7 CORNELi J.L. &
PUB. POi'Y 871, 879 (1998) ("[Ilncreased state expenditures on health care have decreased the
amount of money that states have been able to allocate to other areas (i.e. education,
infrastructure and tax relief).").
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that maximized the satisfaction of needs before it even began to provide
access to "quality of life" goods would be a dismal society indeed. Most
people do not want to devote their entire lives to being maximally secure
and healthy. Why, then, should a society devote all of its resources to
satisfying human needs?165

Choices about these priorities may vary internationally: some nations may treat
health as a paramount value, while others may place greater emphasis on
education or culture. More recently, Veronique Munoz-Darde has similarly
argued that it is appropriate to pursue collective goals and shared projects, such
as the maintenance of museums and universities, even at the expense of
maximally realizing basic needs.166
In an unjust situation-where some countries lack the resources to which
justice entitles them-mandating that all patients worldwide receive the
developed-world standard of care if they are to receive care at all would still be
inappropriate. In fact, it may be more inappropriate, because-in an unjust
situation-mandating that all patients receive the highest standard of care is
likely to prevent many people from receiving any care at all. 161
Some of the attraction of policies like the WHO's ban on used pacemakers
seems to stem from a belief that such policies expressively recognize the
injustice of the current global distribution of resources, whereas providing used
pacemakers would express endorsement of injustice.6 " Acting as we would act
were the distribution of resourcesjust might appear to express endorsement of a just
distribution. On this picture, these policies are justified not because of their
material consequences for patients-and, indeed, in spite of those
consequences-but instead because of what they assert or express. This way of
seeing policies not as a way of producing certain outcomes but instead as "a
form of assertion, a mode of expression in which we purport to represent things
as they really are,""' recalls the views of the eighteenth-century British rationalist
Q.

165

Amy Gutmann, For and Against Equal Access to Health Care, 59 MILBANK
(emphasis in original).
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See Veronique Munoz-Darde, In the Face of Austerity: The Puzzle of Museums and Universities, 21 J.
PoL. PHIL. 221, 239-40 (2013) ("It is through coming together and partaking in idiosyncratic but
necessarily joint enterprises that we find meaning together. It cannot, therefore, be a proper
demand of justice or of morality that this should be forsaken in other than the most extreme
circumstances.").
See John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary MedicalMalpractice Standard,77 VA. L. Riv. 439,
459-60 (1991) ("This choice between high-quality care for a few of the poor or lower quality care
for more of the poor is unquestionably second-best. By definition, the care provided the poor
under the second, binary-standard option is care that a reasonable, fully-informed, paying patient
would regard as inadequate. Yet the care provided under the unitary standard, while avoiding this
problem, is deficient in another respect, for it leaves more of the poor without any care at all.").
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See,for example, Moszczynski, supra note 69, at 89.
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Tamar Schapiro, Three ConceptionsofAction in Moral Theory, 35 NoOs 93, 97 (2001).
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philosopher William Wollaston, who believed "that whoever acts as if things were so,
or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so; as plainly as he could by
words, and with more reality.""o A Wollastonian view might undergird the
WHO's position. If everyone received what justice requires, then no one would
receive used pacemakers; therefore, by ensuring that no one receives used
pacemakers, we express our commitment to everyone's receiving what justice
requires.
However, this view seems untenable for several reasons. First, it is not
clear that providing used pacemakers, for example, would be inappropriate even
under a just economic distribution."' Second, prohibiting the provision of used
pacemakers does not express a commitment that everyone should receive what
justice entitles them to; rather, it seems to express a mistaken belief that
everyone will receive what justice entitles them to. Blocking the provision of
used pacemakers while the distribution of resources remains grossly unjust
seems analogous to another of Wollaston's examples, in which someone uses
and disposes of an object in his possession without in fact owning it. The person
who treats an object as if he owned it does not thereby come to own it: rather,
he simply makes a false assertion.'72 Similarly, blocking the provision of used
pacemakers-and thereby acting as if people had enough money to buy new
ones-does not express a commitment to justice, but simply a mistaken belief
that acting as if injustice did not exist will make injustice go away.17 3
To see this point in greater detail, consider the philosopher Bernard
William's famous scenario of "Jim and the Indians," in which the unjust Captain
threatens to have his henchman Pedro kill a group of Indians unless a bystander,
Jim, is willing to kill one of the Indians instead."' In a just world-one with a
just Captain who makes no threats-it would be morally monstrous for Jim to
kill one of the Indians, just as it would be monstrous to give someone a
suboptimal treatment in a world of unbounded resources. But in Jim's actual
circumstances, it may be morally legitimate for him to kill one of the Indians,
especially with their consent. As Christine Korsgaard argues,
Suppose the oldest Indian steps forward and says "Please go ahead, shoot
me, and I forgive you in advance." This doesn't make things wonderful but
170

Id. (quoting WI.IAM

WOLLASTON, THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED (1722),

excerptedin 1

BRITISH MORALISTS: 1650-1800 242 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1991)) (emphasis in original).
171

See VanArtsdalen et al., supra note 61, at 301 (noting that Sweden and Canada once treated
pacemaker reuse as the standard of care).
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See Schapiro, supra note 169, at 97.
See Rae Langton, Duty and Desolation, 67 PHILOSOPHY 481, 502 (1992) ("Iln an evil world, acting
in accordance with the ideal may backfire, and make the achievement of the ideal more, and not
less, remote.").
SeeJ.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, UTIITARIANisM: FOR AND AGAINST 98 (1973).
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it does help. Very roughly speaking, you are not treating him as a mere
means if he consents to what you are doing. Of course the Indian does not
in general consent to be shot, and his gesture does not mean that after all he
has not been wronged. In the larger moral world he has. But if you and the
Indians are forced to regard Pedro and the Captain as mere forces of nature,
as in this case you are, then there is a smaller moral world within which the
issue is between you and them, and in that world this Indian consents.s75
The Indian's consent does not require Jim to kill him. But, Korsgaard believes, it
at least permits Jim to kill the consenting Indian in order to save others,
particularly since that Indian will be (unjustly) killed anyway. Likewise, the
agreement or consent of people in the developing world permits us to provide
them a second-best treatment, particularly where the alternative for them is
much worse. This is true even if the different needs of developing countries
stemmed from the unjust treatment of their citizens. For instance, as the WHO
has detailed, "the incidence of cervical cancer in developing countries is
relatively high in comparison with the incidence of these cancers in developed
countries, whereas the incidence of breast cancer is relatively low in developing
countries compared with that in developed countries.""' This may be the result
of economic injustice that makes the lifespans of women in developing countries
too short for them to suffer high rates of breast cancer. But even if the higher
rates of cervical cancer in the developing world reflect economic injustice,
blocking developing countries from addressing those higher rates of cervical
cancer and requiring them to devote their resources to breast cancer instead
would be an inappropriate way to recognize that injustice.
Third, even if refusing to provide second-best drugs expresses a
commitment to justice, that expression comes at a substantial cost, one borne
not by those expressing that commitment but rather by the people in need.
Expressing a commitment to justice through protest or speech seems preferable
to expressing that commitment through depriving the worst-off of goods that
would benefit them-to do the latter is not merely to cut one's nose off to spite
one's face, but to cut someone else's nose off in pursuit of that aim. Taking a
pacemaker from the dead body of a citizen of the developed world, sterilizing it,
and implanting it into the body of a developing-world citizen certainly makes the
inequality between the two starkly vivid. The pacemaker is, in a very real way, a
"hand-me-down." But this inequality in treatment serves to narrow the
inequalities in health that global economic inequality produces. Concerns about
equality would be better directed toward reducing global economic inequality
upstream than toward blocking efforts to use limited resources more efficiently.

as
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Christine Korsgaard, The Reasons We Can Share:An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and
Agent-Neutral Values, 10 SOc. PHiL. & PoClY 24,26 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
WORLD BANK, supra note 156, at 582.
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The most compelling case for denying second-best treatments on grounds
of justice appeals to the values of solidarity and community. The economist
Thomas Schelling suggests as much when he states that "[t]hose who want to
risk their lives at sea and cannot afford a safe ship should perhaps not be denied
the opportunity to entrust themselves to a cheaper ship without lifeboats; but if
some people cannot afford the price of passage with lifeboats, and some people
can, they should not travel on the same ship."l 77 That the rich float safely away
from an accident in lifeboats while the poor perish would, in Schelling's view, be
too destructive of solidarity. Criticism of tiered health care proposals that
provide different standards of care for the domestic rich than the domestic poor
may reflect similar reasoning to Schelling's.178
However, others have argued in favor of tiered health care even in the
domestic context, on the basis that blocking the rich from access to higherquality care does no good for the poor, and that the domestic poor may well
prefer lower-quality care to no care at all." 9 As John Siliciano argues,
In a very real sense, then, the poor constitute a separate nation, and their
health care needs should be assessed accordingly. To blink in the face of this
painful reality and judge the medical care provided to the indigent under a
standard of care derived to protect the well-off makes little more sense than
would a foreign aid policy insisting that the humanitarian medical care this

177 THOMAS SCHELLING, CHOICEAND CONSEQUENCE 115-16 (1984).
178

179

See, for example, Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 775 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (noting
that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act "was enacted to stop the
widespread hospital practice of refusing to treat indigent patients, or providing them with a lower
standard of medical care"); Louis v. Perales, No. 91 Civ. 4038 (LMM), 1991 WL 167978, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1991) (reporting plaintiffs' assertion "that the tests ordered by Dr. Louis, and
those performed at the request of other physicians by Biologic, are diagnostic tools routinely
ordered by private physicians for non-Medicaid patients and that the Department's actions force
health care providers to choose between fulfilling their professional responsibilities or
participation as providers in the Medicaid program, and reduce the quality of care available to the
Medicaid beneficiaries by insuring that only providers who will apply a double standard of care
are eligible to participate in the program"); Jeneski v. Myers, 209 Cal. Rptr. 178, 183 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (reporting that a physician objecting to formulary restrictions for Medicaid patients charged
that "the new system constituted a 'clear class system of medical treatment' and a 'double
standard of health care").
See, for example, Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of Health Insurance to
Accommodate Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 AM.J.L. & MED. 187, 200 n.33 (1994) ("[V]arying
tort standards should apply to non-treatment decisions rendered at different funding tiers.");
Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatoy Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The Viginia Obstetrical
No-FaultStatute, 74 VA. L. REV. 1451, 1463 (1988) ("[T]here is no reason to tie the fortunes of the
poor to the tastes of the middle class. The desire for greater legal protection against medical
malpractice may well reflect middle-class patients' greater willingness and ability to pay. There
seems to be no reason to assume that poor people have the same preferences, given their far
lower levels of income. Hence, poor people should not be forced to enter into exactly the same
kind of contracts.").
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country supplies to impoverished nations like Ethiopia or Bangladesh match
that provided by Massachusetts General Hospital. 80
The granting of malpractice immunity to volunteer physicians who treat the
domestic poor seems to reflect this view."'
Even if we accept Schelling's objection as a reason to reject the domestic
double standards Siliciano advocates, the upshot of Schelling's view for global
health is not that we should prohibit the provision of the second-best treatment.
Rather, we should mandate its provision everywhere, and prohibit the best
treatment: if everyone worldwide were "on the same ship" in Schelling's sense,
then no one should receive new pacemakers unless everyone can. A new-pacemaker
mandate that raises some patients to the best available standard but leaves more
patients untreated produces not less inequality but more. 182 Furthermore, as
Schelling granted, different standards of safety may be appropriate for d eerent
ships. If different nations represent different ships-that is, if national borders
matter from the point of view of justice-then it may be acceptable for different
countries to provide different medications to their citizens. Even if no American
should receive new pacemakers unless every American does, it may be
acceptable for Americans to receive new pacemakers in America while nonAmericans receive used ones.
Note that believing national borders matter is very different from believing
existing distributions are just- Someone could believe both that justice requires
substantial transfers from the global North to the global South and that it is
acceptable for the global South to use those transfers differently from the way
they are used in the North. For instance, the global South could permissibly
focus more on the provision of preventive care, food, or education, and less on
the provision of high-technology medical interventions-just as many believe we
should do (but have not been doing) in the global North.183 It would be bizarre
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Siliciano, supra note 167, at 465-66.
See, for example, Gwendolyn L. Pulido, Immunity of Volunteer Health Care Providers in Texas: Bartering
Legal RPghts for Free Medical Care, 2 SCHOIAR 323, 342 (2000); see also John L. Brown, Statutorg
Immunity for Volunteer Physidans: A Vehicle for Reaffirmation of the Doctor's Beneficent Duties-Absent the
Rights Talk, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 425, 425, 460 (1996).
See Siliciano, supra note 167, at 484 ("[Tlhe symbolic affirmation of equality embedded in the
unitary standard loses much of its force when it is preceded by tort law's other message in this
context: that absent an emergency, indigent patients have absolutely no right of access to the
health care system.").
See Lance Gable, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Health, and the Elusive Target of
Human Rights, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 340, 342 (2011) ("The prevailing incongruity between high
health care expenditures and less than impressive health outcomes in the United States likely
stems from a number of sources, including ... a preference for costly high-technology health care
over more affordable preventive approaches."); Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Restoring Health to
Health Reform: Integrating Medicine and Public Health to Advance the Population's Well-Being, 159 U. PA. L.
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to prohibit developing nations from adopting the cost-control measures that we
believe we should adopt merely because in developed countries we cannot bring
ourselves to adopt them.
What if the international and developed-country decision-makers
attempting to help developing countries grapple with the effects of an unjust
distribution of resources are themselves, as Thomas Pogge and others argue, the
cause of that unjust distribution of resources?184 This may make these actors
blameworthy for the initial injustice, but it still fails to justify a choice to save
fewer people from being harmed by that injustice. Imagine that I-through
negligence or recklessness-have caused a fire that threatens to destroy an
apartment building. Turning on the sprinkler system will stop the fire but ruin
many people's valuables. Yet it seems obvious that I should turn the sprinkler
on: I cannot undo my past wrong, but I can partly mitigate its effects. This is
true even if I could fully mitigate the effects of my wrongdoing: even if I have a
fire extinguisher, but do not want to take the risk of putting out the fire myself, I
should still activate the sprinkler rather than simply fleeing. Likewise, even if
developed countries and international institutions bear responsibility for poverty
in developed countries, and indeed even if they could provide the resources to
fully undo the health effects of that poverty, they still would do better to provide
second-best treatments than to do nothing at all to mitigate the wrong, orworse-to exacerbate the wrong by promulgating an unfunded mandate that all
patients receive the best available treatment.
C. Consequences
Some commentators have argued in the context of HIV treatment that
mandating the provision of the best extant intervention worldwide wil force
down its cost and produce better long-term outcomes.' Likewise, some argue
REv. 1777, 1783 (2011) (proposing "reforms [that] involve shifting the financial and political
focus away from high-cost, high-technology interventions, thereby transforming the nation's
conception of medicine, public health, and health itself"); John A. Robertson, Iaw, Science, and
Innovation: Introduction to the Symposium, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHiCs 175, 187 (2010) (describing legal
scholar Rebecca Dresser as "questioning whether advanced societies should be so focused on
expensive technologies that treat the chronic diseases of aging, such as heart disease, diabetes, and
neurological disorders, when many more people would benefit from the same funds being spent
on prevention and the delivery of health care").
154 See generally THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

(2002); see also Ilan

Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: GlobalusticeImplicationsfor InternationalTrade and 7ax Law,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2010).
185 See, for example, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PLHIV INPUT INTO THE REVISION OF THE
WHO ART GUIDELINES 6 (2009), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/treatment/
final-report_.gnphiv.pdf ("Many felt that if tenofovir were made part of first line regimens, there
would be increased pressure to increase generic production and lower its price.").

Winter 2015

601

Chicago Journalof InternationalL-an

in favor of publicly adopting a definition of the right to health that is more
expansive than may actually be justified-such as the "highest attainable
standard"-in order to ensure that the right to health survives the realities of
political compromise.' Evaluating this debate requires more empirical evidence
than either side currently possesses, and more than I am qualified to assess. But
I will note that any such empirical investigation must attend to opportunity
costs. Lowering the price of tenofovir or new pacemakers over the long-term
through negotiation or technical innovation could potentially coexist with
continuing to provide stavudine or reused pacemakers in the short term. And
even if purchase prices drop because of negotiation, the time and political capital
invested in these efforts might have helped many more people if deployed
elsewhere. For instance, cutting stavudine costs by $30 per year would improve
access more than would cutting tenofovir's price in half."'
This argument raises an additional ethical concern if the suffering of those
who go without aid becomes a means, rather than a side effect, of lowering costs.
Mandating the gold standard both because drug companies will cave and lower
prices when faced with people suffering from lack of tenofovir, but would not
cave if those people were treated with stavudine, inappropriately uses nonconsenting patients who are left to suffer as hostages in an effort to pressure
corporations and developed countries to lower drug prices. That developingcountry patients have the right to go without second-best care in protest of
injustice does not support our forcing that outcome on them, just as prisoners'
right to a hunger strike to protest inadequate conditions would not support
outside activists imposing deprivation on non-consenting prisoners in order to
highlight the injustice of the prison system.
Adopting a conception of the right to health more expansive than is
actually warranted may likewise be inappropriate. Some have argued that it is
inappropriate for prosecutors to "overcharge" arrestees-charging them with
offenses that do not fit their alleged crime's actual severity-in order to gain
leverage for a plea bargain.'." Likewise, it may be inappropriate to enforce a

186

187

188

See, for example, Attaran, supra note 97, at 36 ("'Maximum' stands for idealism; 'available' stands for
reality. 'Maximum' is the sword of human rights rhetoric; 'available' is the wiggle room for the
state.") (quoting R. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obhgation to Devote the 'Maximum
Available Resources" to Realiring Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 693, 694
(1994)).
Robin Wood, The Role of Stavudine in the South African Public SectorAntiretroviralProgramme: Should the
Perfect Be the Enemy of the Good?, 7 S. AFR.J. HIV MED. 5, 5 (2006).
See, for example, Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionaly Charged: The ProsecutorialCharging Decision and the
Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2189-90 (2010) ("Several ethics codes . . . forbid
prosecutors from 'overcharging' solely in the hopes of developing leverage for plea bargaining
negotiations.').
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conception of the right to health one knows to be overbroad in order to exert
political leverage. Additionally, selecting an overly expansive conception may be
counterproductive as well as unjust: where rights claims seem unfulfillable,
people may come to ignore them entirely, whereas a more modest conception of
the right might have greater practical force.'"
V. PREVENTING THE PANDEMIC
The previous section argued that costly rights and mandates, such as
requirements that developing countries provide the standard of care provided in
developed countries, lack sound normative justification. In this section, I argue
for rethinking rights to health and to healthcare interventions in order to place
them on a sounder foundation, one that promotes health across the population
and affords developing countries greater discretion.
A. Adequacy, Not Maximization
Recognizing an individual right to the highest attainable standard of health
exposes emerging international institutions and developing nations to the same
problem that developed nations like the U.S. and Germany now face:' 90 the high
cost of medical care, which threatens spending on other essentials. Unless we are
to abandon the right to health altogether, we need an alternative, less
problematic understanding of that right; I argue for understanding it as a right to
adequate resources to maintain health, rather than to the highest attainable
standard of individual health. Such a standard avoids many of the problems of
the ICESCR standard, while still maintaining the idea that there is a robust and
enforceable right to health.
Defining the right to health as an adequacy right has previously been
recognized as tenable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
chose the language of adequacy rather than the language of maximization:

189

See Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 2 E. EUR. CONST. Ri-v. 35, 37 (1993) (arguing that
unachievable positive entitlements can reinforce "cynicism about constitutions").

190

See Klaus M. Brisch & Claudia E. Haupt, Information Technology Meets Healthcare: The Present and
Future of German and European E-Health Initiatives, 12 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CAR: L. 105, 114 (2009)
("The health care costs in Germany are among the highest in Europe and they are continuously
on the rise. In fact, it has been asserted that the very concept of the social state has entered a
critical phase and the currently high level of social welfare benefits cannot be financed in the long
term."); see also Maggie H. Francis, Beyond "Safe and Efective": The Role of the Federal Government in
Supporting and DisseminatingComparaive-Effectiveness Research, 21 ANNAiS HEALTH L. 329, 339 (2012)
(noting that "all developed countries have struggled with cost control issues to some extent");
Douglas J. Besharov, CreatingA Marketplacefor Social llelfare Services, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 519, 555 (2002) ("In the United States and many other OECD countries, the costs
of fee-for-service health care programs are escalating rapidly.").
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"[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.""' The UDHR conception,
unlike that of the ICESCR, sees the right to health as on par and interrelated
with other important social and economic rights like food, clothing, and
housing. (It is particularly interesting that Paul Farmer, whom many see as
radically committed to the rights of the poor, references an adequacy right rather
than the seemingly more generous maximization right. )
An adequacy right, by permitting a variety of limitations on individual
efforts to pursue maximal health, may promote population health in a variety of
ways. For instance, an adequacy right would permit the government to prevent
patients from accessing medications that lack clinical trial testing and approval.'
Preventing such access could help to protect the integrity of the clinical trial
system and therefore promote long-run population health.' 94
Permitting states to limit access to certain health care services also provides
a crucial tool to stem runaway costs and the diversion of resources away from
essential health and non-health goals. In contrast, allowing each person to
maximize her individual health without restriction may incentivize specialization
in expensive procedures rather than cost-effective ones.9

'91
192

193

194

195

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71, art. 25
(1948) (emphasis added).
See Farmer & Gastineau, supra note 130, at 655. Farmer is also willing to prioritize some health
goals over others. See Paul Farmer, Never Again? Reflections on Human Values and Human Rights, in
PARTNER TO THE POOR: A PAUL FARMER READER 517 (Haun Saussy ed., 2010) ("Relativism is a
part of the problem. Why is it impolitic in the groves of academe to argue that dying of nevertreated AIDS in a dirt-floored hut in Africa is worse than dying of AIDS in a comfortable hospice
in Boston after having failed a decade of therapy?").
This issue was raised in American courts in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs v. Von Eschebach, 495 F.3d 695 (2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008) (reversing panel
decision supporting a fundamental right to access unapproved but potentially lifesaving drugs).
See generaly Seema Shah & Patricia Zettler, From a ConstitutionalRight to a Poliy ofExceptions: Abigail
Alliance and the Future ofAccess to Experimental Therapy, 10 YALE J. HEAiLTH Pot'y, L. & ETHICS 1
(2010); Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail Alliance: The Reality Behind the Right to Get ExperinmentalDrugs,
56 KAN. L. RIv. 1045 (2008).
See Gutmann, supra note 165, at 552 ("Without restricting the free market in extra health care
goods, a society risks having its best medical practitioners drained into the private market sector,
thereby decreasing the quality of medical care received by the majority of citizens confined to the
publicly funded sector."); see also Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era oflFractalInequality,19
ANNALs HEALTH L. 269, 310 (2010) ("A relatively fixed supply of doctors can mean that any
group that uses its buying power to purchase disproportionately time-consuming (and often
unnecessary) medical attention threatens to divert care from those with less purchasing power.").
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Another advantage of defining the right to health in adequacy terms is the
leeway it provides for experimentation by different nations and localities, in
contrast to the transnational uniformity the maximization standard requires.
Such local experimentation has been praised in other contexts."' While some
suggest that the right to the highest attainable standard of health is inherently
flexible,' the textual provisions they reference do not support such flexibility.
"Progressive realization"' of the right to maximal health simply delays the
problem of excessive cost, and even if the highest attainable standard evolves
over time,' the highest attainable standard at any given time may still be
extremely demanding. In contrast, an adequacy right permits greater scope for
discretionary choices.
Defining the right to health as an adequacy right may sometimes allow the
wealthy to buy their way to better health. But a threshold of adequacy can
guarantee certain basic and essential health interventions to poor and rich alike,
and it can provide many people services that will help them integrate into the
population. A plausible right to adequacy will sometimes mean that we have to
say "no" to someone who can genuinely benefit, as the South African
Constitutional Court did in Soobramoney. But such a right will also give us the
financial leeway to say "yes" to another person down the road who needs an
immunization, or to fund a new primary school.
Ultimately, adequacy's willingness to countenance inequality is not a
necessary feature of adequacy. Rather, inequality stems more centrally from the
fact that we countenance substantial intranational and international inequalities
in wealth. Given those inequalities, we are faced with the choice of either
blocking exchanges that would convert wealth to health, or permitting
inequalities in health. An adequacy right-unlike a maximization right-permits
us, for instance, to tax cost-ineffective medical procedures as luxuries. These
taxes could be reinvested in maintaining health infrastructure for the poor, or in
other social aims like education. In contrast, a maximization right commits us to
matching, for each individual, whatever health expenditures the wealthiest
among us decide on for themselves. As we learn from the example of the tutelas,
such a system is unsustainable: it limits care not by cost-effectiveness or clinical
196

See, for example, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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Alicia Ely Yamin, The Rght to Health Under InternationalLaw and Its Relevance to the United States, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1156, 1156 (2005) ("The reference to a 'highest attainable standard' of
health . . . builds in a reasonableness standard.").

198

Id

199

See id. ("[TIhe highest attainable standard will necessarily evolve over time, in response to medical
inventions, as well as demographic, epidemiological, and economic shifts.").
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effectiveness, but by financial exhaustion. The ability of the wealthy to purchase
expensive drugs or procedures despite the luxury tax I suggest is more properly
attributed to the inequalities we countenance than to the definition of the right
to health in adequacy terms.
On an adequacy view, Soobramoney was in fact rightly decided, and-far
from being a timid decision-it was actually a courageous one. It is easy for a
court to rule in favor of a sympathetic plaintiff and ignore the long-term
consequences of a judgment. What the South African Constitutional Court did
in Soobramoney, and what is admirable about that decision, was to look ahead and
rule based on the long-term effects of the decision on all affected parties, rather
than the effects on one party alone.

B. Local Variation, Not Transnational Uniformity
The WHO should move toward the model it chose for antiepileptic
medications and for antibiotics, which allows for local sovereignty and variations
in the standard of care, and away from its cost-blind, universal recommendations
regarding medical donations and HIV medication. Countries should be
empowered to make risk-benefit decisions for themselves, rather than having
those decisions made in other countries. Local variations in disease prevalence,
in available resources, and in societal priorities can all appropriately affect which
medical treatments are available in different countries,2" and at what cost.
This does not imply that universal human rights should not be upheld, nor
that developed countries should simply ship drugs overseas and let developing
countries sort things out. But universal human rights should be upheld on the
ground that they are universal, not on the ground that developed countries have
adopted them. And developed countries would do better to focus on providing
relevant guidance-such as information about the safety and efficacy of
pharmaceuticals-instead of banning exports that may be cost-effective
elsewhere.
Furthermore, international and foreign decision makers should attend to
the judgment of all developing country citizens about the appropriate
distribution of resources, rather than catering primarily to the demands of

200

See MILTON SILVERMAN, THE DRUGGING OF THE AMERICAS: How MULTINATIONAL DRUG
COMPANIES SAY ONE THING ABOUT THEIR PRODUCTS TO PHYSICIANS IN THE UNITED STATES,
AND ANOTHER THING TO PHYSICIANS IN LATIN AMERICA 131 (1976) ("[N]either the United States

nor any other nation has a mandate or moral right to export its health policies to other countries,
or to induce by whatever means any other country to adopt its own decisions, practices, customs,
techniques or standards. The health policy decisions in each [country] must be made by those
countries.").
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special-interest groups within developing countries. For this reason, I disagree in
part with M. H. Kottow's argument that
[t]he acceptability of negative side effects in relation to purported benefits is
not to be decided by benevolent paternalism; rather, it is for public health
policies and for the affected population to evaluate, especially if the
argument of lesser evil is invoked. Whether it is preferable to avoid
pregnancy at the risk of getting cancer can only be decided by the women to
whom quinacrine [a sterilization drug] might be offered, supported by local
health care officials who must assess the rationale of this approach as
compared to alternatives. 201
I agree with Kottow that no competent patient should be forced to take a drug
she finds excessively dangerous. As Emilio Perucca and Rajendra Kale observe
with regard to antiepileptic medications, "local doctors should not present
phenobarbital to patients as the best drug but should inform them about its
advantages and disadvantages (and deficiencies in knowledge) compared with
alternative treatments."20 2 But, at the policy rather than physician-patient level,
stakeholders other than the potential beneficiaries of a treatment should be
involved in deciding what treatments are available. Some diseases-like HIV and
heart disease-are prevalent in both developed and developing countries; their
broader prevalence makes possible the development of transnational patient and
disease advocacy efforts.203 Others, like malaria and obstetric fistula, are
concentrated in developing countries: unlike the case of HIV, there is no
transnational network of malaria sufferers that includes better-resourced citizens
of developed countries.204 Responding to pressure from disease advocacy groups

201
202
203

204

M.H. Kottow, Who Is My Brother'sKeeper?, 28J. MED. En-Tics 24, 24 (2002).
Kale & Perucca, supra note 28, at 1200.
See Mindy Jane Roseman & Alice M. Miller, Normaliing Sex and Its Discontents: Estabshing Sexual
Rights in International La, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 313, 329 (2011) (noting the "emergence of
national and transnational HIV activism in the latter part of the twentieth century"); Harold
Hongju Koh, Different but Equak The Human Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities,63 MD. L.
Riv. 1, 9-10 (2004) (discussing "the formation of. . . a 'transnational human rights network' that
has worked to expose worldwide discrimination against persons with intellectual disabilities").
See Laurie Garrett, The Challenge of Global Health, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 14, 23 (an.-Feb. 2007)
("Diseases and health conditions that enjoy a temporary spotlight in rich countries garner the
most attention and money. This means that advocacy, the whims of foundations, and the
particular concerns of wealthy individuals and governments drive practically the entire global
public health effort. Today the top three killers in most poor countries are maternal death around
childbirth and pediatric respiratory and intestinal infections leading to death from pulmonary
failure or uncontrolled diarrhea. But few women's rights groups put safe pregnancy near the top
of their list of priorities, and there is no dysentery lobby or celebrity attention given to coughing
babies."); see id. at 27-28 ("[Niothing is being done to replace the health-care workers who once
dealt with malaria, dysentery, vaccination programs, maternal health, and other issues that lack
activist constituencies."); see also Colleen C. Denny & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, US Health Aid beyond
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will lead to resources flowing toward more transnationally powerful groupsnew pacemakers for those with heart disease or expensive drugs for those with
HIV-even while less powerful groups such as malaria sufferers miss out on
beneficial interventions, or the population at large suffers from reduced
spending on education and infrastructure. While patients should be informed
about the risks and benefits of second-best interventions, patient advocacy
groups must make their case for funding to their fellow citizens and community
members; they should not be permitted to short-circuit the decision-making
process by appealing directly to interest groups within developed countries.20 5
The power and potentially distorting effect of transnational disease
advocacy also presents a challenge for private and nonprofit philanthropists and
funders. I would not uniformly criticize the philanthropic provision of
interventions that are not maximally cost-effective, such as the provision of
guide dogs for the blind rather than interventions to prevent blindness."' When
private citiZens do good, they are not required to maximize the good they do nor
to distribute that good impartially; people enjoy latitude when fulfilling duties of
charity.207 The money Paul Farmer and his colleagues spent on rescuing those on
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206

207

PEPFAR.- The Mother '- Child Campaign, 300 JAMA 2048, 2049 (2008) (proposing moving aid
away from HIV treatment and toward pediatric and prenatal care).
See Northwestern Univ. v. City of Evanston, No. 00-C-7309, 2002 WL 31027981, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 11, 2002) (noting that "when a small, organized block of adjacent landowners opposes a
zoning change, the block often gets its way," and citing the work of economist Mancur Olson); see
also David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CoRNELL L. REv. 397, 436 (2002)
(suggesting how the outsize pull of special interest groups can be overcome within a democracy).
But see Toby Ord, The Moral Imperaive toward Cost-Efectiveness in Global Health, Ctr. Global
Development Essay (Mar. 2013), available at http://www.cgdev.org/publication/moralimperative-toward-cost-effectiveness-global-health ("We could ... use our entire budget to
provide a single guide dog, helping one person overcome the challenges of blindness, or we could
use it to cure more than 2,000 people of blindness. If we think that people have equal moral
value, then the second option is more than 2,000 times better than the first. Put another way, the
first option squanders about 99.95 percent of the value that we could have produced.").
See, for exaple, Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. 127, 197 (1844) (refusing to require of a charitable
bequest that "the scheme of education by him prescribed, is such as we ourselves should approve,
or as is best adapted to accomplish the great aims and ends of education"); see also Michael W.
McConnell, The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on Religious-Cultural-Political
Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TuLSA L. REv. 7, 29 (2001) (noting that "Justice Story's 1844
decision [in Vida relied on ... the proposition that philanthropists have great latitude in
directing the objects of their charity"); Jeremy Waldron, On the Road: GoodSamaritansand Compelling
Duies, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1053, 1071 (2000) ("When we think about beneficence, we may
regard it as (in the technical philosophical sense) an imperfect duty: a duty that commands
concern for the welfare of others, but which is understood to leave a certain amount of latitude
for free choice in determining what to do about it. For example: I meet many beggars as I walk
around New York, and I am sure it would be wrong not to give money to any of them; but I am
(almost) equally sure it would distort my moral situation to require me to give money to each, or
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death's door in Haiti and Boston could have been spent, as Farmer himself
grants, on more cost-effective interventions.208 Such interventions would have
helped more people and saved more lives. But Farmer did far more good than
he would have had he used that money to pay himself a higher salary, or even to
provide patients in the developed world many treatments that are routine and
acceptable there.
However, providers of private charity must be mindful of their impact on
public authorities. For instance, even if HPV vaccination is initially privately
subsidized, accepting free vaccinations may later commit a government to
spending its own resources on vaccination rather than on more pressing aims.209
And philanthropic aid for patients with specific medical conditions frequently
diverts equipment, funding, and expertise away from efforts to treat other
conditions, improve public health, or pursue non-health aims.210 The solidaristic
motivation that supports providing the same expensive treatments worldwide
for conditions, like HIV, from which people in the developed and developing
world both suffer, has as its less savory side the deprivation of those who suffer
from diseases unknown or ignored in the developed world.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wealthy countries face a pressing challenge in the twenty-first century:
controlling the rise in medical costs.2 11 In many cases, they have been unable to
stem the tide of rising costs, and, even where costs have temporarily leveled

208

to say that I am required to use specified criteria to figure out who to give money to and who to
refuse.").
See Farmer & Gastineau, supra note 130, at 664 ("We didn't argue that it was 'cost-effective,' not
did we promise that such efforts would be replicable.").

See Ouedraogo et al., supra note 90, at 316.
ee Lawrence 0. Gostin, Meeting the Survival Needs of the World's Least Healthy People: A Proposed
Modelfor Global Health Governance, 298 JAMA 225, 225 (2007) ("International health assistance is
provided in an ineffective way that does not enhance the capability for human functioning. Most
funding is driven by emotional, high-visibility events, including large-scale natural disasters such
as the Asian tsunami; diseases that capture the public's imagination such as the human
immunodeficiency virus and AIDS; or diseases with the potential for rapid global transmission
such as hemorrhagic fever, severe acute respiratory syndrome, or pandemic influenza. These
funding streams skew priorities and divert resources from building stable local systems to meet
everyday health needs."); Garrett, supra note 204 (reporting statement of Botswanan physician
Ndwapi Ndwapi that "Botswana's future rests on its ability to fully integrate HIV/AIDS care into
the general health-care system, so that it no longer draws away scarce doctors and nurses for
HIV/AIDS-only care").
211 See, for example, Korobkin, supra note 12, at 524-25 (reviewing data on rising American health care
costs).
209
210

Winter 2015

609

ChicagoJournalof Internationallaw

off,212 they may rise again as economic fortunes improve. But developed
countries, with their higher per capita incomes, are in a much better position to
face these costs than developing countries are. Imposing rising health care costs
on these nations would be disastrous.
Developed countries and international bodies like the WHO stand at a
crossroads between two different approaches to international health. One
approach would extend what Haavi Morreim called the "unitary standard of
care"2 13 globally, mandating that the global poor must receive the same standard
of care as the global rich if they are to receive any care at all, or entitling every
citizen to the highest standard of care at state expense. The WHO's approach to
HIV treatment and medical donation, and the Colombian tutela approach to the
right to health, seem to adopt the unitary standard. In contrast, the WHO's
willingness to accept different standards of care for antiepileptic medications,
antibiotic treatment for meningitis, and the pertussis vaccine, as well as
Soobramoney's approach to the right to health, reflect a willingness to accept
differentiated standards in order to control costs while helping more patients.
This Article has described the two approaches and argued in favor of
differentiated standards.
Even if Americans choose to retain the unitary standard domestically in the
face of growing domestic inequality, mandating a single standard of care across
international borders jeopardizes the health of the global poor and holds their
healthcare systems and budgets hostage to the choices of the wealthiest and
most health-conscious patients in the developed world. During the debate over
the DEAA, Senator Ted Kennedy-one of the most passionate defenders of
universal health care in the U.S. 2 1 4-criticized the ban on exporting unapproved
drugs as "'arrogance' which threatened to deny needed drugs to those in
countries in which they had been approved."215 More recent efforts to globally
mandate a single standard of care threaten a similar outcome, not only for
patients who are deprived of beneficial second-best treatments and instead
212

213

214

215

See Meghan S. Stubblebine, Note, The FederalMedical I-oss Ratio: A Permissible FederalRegnlation or an
Encroachment on State Power?, 55 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 341, 379 (2013) (describing evidence that
health care cost increases slowed in the U.S. during 2012).
E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. Riv. 1719, 1725
(1987) ("Mlalpractice law presumes that there is a unitary standard of care that a physician owes
to each patient he undertakes to treat.").
See Barry R. Furrow, Health Reform and Ted Kennedy The Art ofPolitics .. , and Persistence, 14 N.Y.U.J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 445, 457-66 (2011) (detailing Kennedy's commitment to universal health
care); see also Bohrer v. City Hosp., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 657, 678 (N.D. W. Va. 2010) (noting that
Kennedy sponsored the "law which created the federal support for Community Health Care
Centers").
Hatton, spra note 37, at 440 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. S5661 (daily ed. May 8, 1986) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy)).
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receive nothing, but also for their fellow citizens whose infrastructure and
educational system are undermined by the pressure to provide high-cost
interventions to needy patients.
In rethinking the norms and mandates that govern global health, public,
nonprofit, and private decision makers should look to international
environmental law, which has explicitly allowed for different standards of care in
different countries: "Environmental standards, management objectives and
priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which
they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of
unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular
developing countries." 216 This language from the Rio Declaration of 1992 is
echoed in other human rights documents, such as Agenda 21 and the Stockholm
Declaration. 217 Global health decision-makers should follow environmental law's
lead. Rather than internationally mandating the standard of care adopted in
wealthy developed countries in pursuit of the well-intentioned but ultimately
misguided goal of avoiding double standards, they would do better to adopt a
more nuanced and flexible approach that allows developing countries to pursue
a variety of paths toward public health and fiscal sustainability.

216

217

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, Principle 11, U.N.Doc. A/Conf. 151/5 at 4, reprintedin 31 I.L.M.
at 878.
See UNCED: Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, in REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTiE FOR A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND PART OF ITs FIFTH SESSION, INC/FCCC, 5th

Sess., 2d Part, at Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1 (identical text to the Rio
Declaration); UNCED, Agenda 21, ch. 2, f 2.20, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(1992) ("[Aiccount should be taken of the fact that environmental standards valid for developed
countries may have unwarranted social and economic costs in developing countries."); Report of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 26th Sess., Principle 23, U.N.Doc.
A/CONF.48/14, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972) ("jT1t will be essential in all cases to consider the
systems of values prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability of standards which
are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted
social cost for the developing countries."); see also Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrieror Trade Boon? A
CriticalEvaluation of Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade, 21 CouM. J.
ENvTL. L. 205, 262 (1996) ("Because each country's economic and environmental conditions are
different, developed countries should not attempt to export their environmental values or
harmonize environmental laws around the globe.").
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